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PART  A:  INTRODUCTION  AND  BACKGROUND 
1.  Introduction  and  Terms  of  Reference 
In  January  1985,  the  EC  Commission  awarded  to  PA  International 
Consulting  Services  Ltd.  a  brief  to  carry  out  a  study  of  EC 
liquor and  wine  exports  to Japan. 
The  decision  to  undertake  the  study  was  taken  largely  because  of 
considerable  and  long-standing  dissatisfaction,  among  both 
European  exporters  and  their  agents  in  Japan,  about  the 
relatively  low  level  of  market  penetration  of  European  liquors 
and  wines  in  the  Japanese  market.  Performance  has  varied  from 
product  to  product,  with  the  most  serious  problems  confronting 
Scotch whisky,  which  has  been  losing market  share  for at  least  5 
years  and  achieved  only  6%  of  the Japanese  whisky  market  in 1984. 
Other  EC  products  have  fared  better,  brandy  and  wines  in 
particular but  concern has  also been  expressed  about  their future 
market  growth. 
Against  this  background,  the  basic  purpose  of  the  study  was  to 
recommend,  based  on  thorough  investigation  and  analysis,  what 
actions  should  be  taken  to  increase  the  overall  level  of  EC 
exports  of  liquors  and  wine  to Japan. 
The  study was  designed  in  two  main  stages: 
Stage  1  was  concerned  with  assembling  basic  quantitative 
market  information,  examining  the  regulatory,  tariff,  tax 
and  other  issues  and  assessing  the  views  of  the  European 
interests  on  the  problems  facing  EC  liquors  exports  in 
the  Japanese  market.  A  significant  input  at  this  stage 
came  from  the  briefing  notes  provided  by  the  EC  Liquor 
Committee,  which  is  one  of  several  similar  committees 
working  in  Tokyo  under  the aegis  of  the  European  Business 
Council  and  which  played  its  part  in  formulating  the 
overall  structure  of  the project. -2-
At  the  end  of  Stage  1,  it was  agreed  that  the  key  issues 
to be  addressed  in  the  study  included: 
liquor  tax 
import duties 
parallel  imports 
product  information  and  labelling 
retail pricing 
product  and  market  development 
business  development  in Japan 
Stage  2,  in  which  the  consultants  undertook  a  more 
detailed  study  of  the  structure  of  the  market  in  Japan 
and  examined  in-depth  the  issues  listed above. 
[Note]:  It  has  been  agreed,  after  discussions  with  the  EC 
Delegation  and  the  Liquor  Committee,  that  beer  would  not  be 
covered  in  any  detail  in  this  project.  However,  some  notes  on 
the market  for  imported  beers  are  included  in Appendix  11;  these 
provide basic beer market  statistics and  present  a  summary  of  the 
reasons  why  the question of beer has  not  been  examined  in depth. 
2.  Summary  of Work  Done 
All  the  work  necessary  for  the  completion  of  the  study  have  now 
been  carried  out.  In  the  course  of  our  investigations,  we  have 
interviewed  some  25  organisations  involved  in  Japan  in· the  EC 
liquor  business;  in  Europe,  interviews  were  conducted  with 
relevant  organisations  in  the  main  countries  producing  and 
exporting  alcoholic  beverages.  Further  work  has  been  done  in 
Japan  to  interview  a  cross-section  of  local  manufacturers, 
distributors,  wholesalers  and  retailers  engaged  in  the  liquor 
trade  and  discussions  have  been  held  with  the  Fair  Trade 
Commission  and  with  selected  consumer  groups. -3-
In  the  course  of  the  study,  in  particularly  during  the  second 
stage,  the  consultants have worked  very  closely with  and  received 
substantial  cooperation  from  the  members  of  the  EC  Liquor 
Committee. 
We  enclose  in  Appendix  10  a  complete  list  of  the  people  and 
organisations with  whom  we  have  been  in  contact  in  the  course  of 
our  study. 
3.  Structure  of  This  Report 
In  structuring  this  study  report,  we  have  presented,  in  Part  B, 
an  overview  of  the  Japanese  market  for  EC  alcoholic  beverages. 
For  the  rest,  we  have written  separate Parts  covering  each  of  the 
main  issues  that  emerged  as  critical  in  the  course  of  our  work. 
Details are as  follows: 
Part  C:  Liquor  tax  in Japan 
Part D:  Import  duties  on  liquors 
Part  E:  Parallel  imports 
Part F:  Product  information  and  labelling 
Part G:  Business  and  marketing  considerations 
Part H:  Other  issues 
Supporting  data  to  the  report  are  included  in  a  series  of 
Appendices,  which  are  presented  as  a  separate  volume  of  the 
overall  report.  In  particular,  we  draw  attention  to  the  series 
of  statistical  tables  in  Appendix  1;  these  present  a 
comprehensive  picture  of  the  history  and  development  of  the 
liquor  industry  from  a  statistical  viewpoint,  up  to  the  end  of 
the  1984  calendar year. -4-
4.  Appreciation 
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PART  B:  OVERVIEW:  THE  JAPANESE  MARKET  FOR  EC  ALCOHOLIC  BEVERAGES 
1.  Market  Performance  of  EC  Wines  and  Liquors 
Two  facts  immediately  strike  the  observer  of  the  market  in  Japan 
for  alcoholic  beverages  from  EC  supplying  countries: 
EC  exports  to  Japan  are  already  substantial  and 
significant.  Of  the  three main  exports,  Scotch  whisky  is 
the  largest  single  product  export  from  the  U.K.  to  Japan 
and  brandy  is  similarly France's  largest  product  export. 
Exports  of  wine,  while  lower  in  value  than  those  of 
Scotch  whisky  or  brandy,  are  already  substantial  1n 
volume. 
On  the  other  hand,  tax-cleared  shipments  of  imported 
finished  products  represent  a  minute  fraction  of  the 
total  Japanese  market,  their  share  of  the  total  volume 
consumed  ranging  between  0.8  and  1.0%  over  the  last  five 
years. 
In  broad  terms,  the  Japanese  market  for  alcoholic  beverages  has 
been  traditionally  domina ted  by  beer  and  sake,  with  shochu  and 
whisky  the  only  two  other  significant  products: 
Beer  in  1984  accounted  for  65%  of  the  total  market  by 
volume,  this  percentage  having  declined  very  slowly  over 
the  last  three years. 
Sake's  share  at  under  19%  has  been  falling  away  rather 
more  steadily. -6-
Shochu  share  has  been  increasing  steadily  since  the  late 
1970s  and  in  1984  it  surged  from  just  over  5%  to  nearly 
8%. 
The  share  of  whisky  had  been  stagnant  at  around  5%  for 
many  years  but  lost  almost  1  percentage  point  with  the 
decline  in 1984. 
Within  this  framework,  wine  is  sti  11  a  very  small  player  with 
just  1%  of  total  consumption. 
Liquor  imports  into Japan  from  all  sources  have  been  dominated  by 
whisky,  wine,  brandy  and  beer as  the  following  table  shows: 
Imports  of Liquors 
(Share  of  import  market  by  type) 
Calendar Years 
Volume·  Value 
Product  1983  1984  1983  1984 
%  %  %  % 
Whisky  37  38  46  NA 
Wine  31  34  19  NA 
Beer  15  8  6  NA 
Brandy  9  9  22  NA -7-
Looking at  the overall  import  volume  trends,  whisky  has  generally 
declined  since  1980,  beer  dropped  steeply  in  1984  after  5  years 
of  steady  growth,  wine  shows  the  most  consistent  rising  pattern, 
while  brandy  after  some  years  of  steady  growth  declined 
marginally  in  1984. 
In  the  comparison  between  bulk  and  bottled  imports: 
For  whisky,  bulk  represents  55%  of  the  total  imports  by 
volume  with  no  noticeable  trend 
Brandy  bulk is  38%  of  total  imports  by  volume 
For  wine,  the  bulk  share  of  volume  is  currently  57%, 
again with  no  marked  trend. 
As  indicated  above,  1984  was  a  year  of  significant  change  in  the 
Japanese  liquor  market.  Shochu  volume  increased  by  almost  40% 
over  the  previous  year.  The  main  sufferer was  whisky  and  the big 
domestic  producers  in  particular  found  their  whisky  volume  down 
over  20%  compared  with  1983. 
Demographic  changes  in  the  market  structure  are  having  a  strong 
influence  on  product  preferences  and  major  changes  in  drinking 
habits  are  taking  place.  Women,  particularly  younger  working 
women,  are  playing  an  increasing  part  in  the  market;  this  is  one 
of  the  reasons  for  the  shift  towards  softer,  milder,  blander 
drinks,  in many  cases  mixes  and  the  remarkable  shochu  boom.  The 
sufferers  have  been  the  hard  liquors,  with  whisky  at  the 
forefront.  The  research  studies  we  have  read  suggest  there  is 
every  reason  to  think  these  trends  wi 11  be  maintained,  though 
very  recent  sales  patterns  suggest  some  slight  reversal  of  the 
trends  so evident  in 1984. 
The  following  paragraphs  examine  in more  detail  the  position  for 
each  of  the  three  major  European  exports: 
and  brandy. 
Scotch  whisky,  wine -8-
1.1  Scotch Whisky 
World  sales  of  Scotch  whisky  in volume,  on  a  strong  upward  trend 
throughout  the  early  '70s,  peaked  in  1978  and  the  trend  has  been 
mainly  downwards  since,  falling  particularly  sharply  in  1983. 
Figures  for  1984  show  a  small  gain,  suggesting  that  the  trend 
has  possibly  been  reversed. 
The  decline  has  been  almost  entirely  in  bottled  sales;  exports 
of  bulk  have  been  holding  their  position quite  steadily.  Total 
Scotch  export  volume  declined  by  16%  between  1978  and  1984,  with 
bottled  sales  dropping  some  22%  over  the  same  6  year period. 
These  declines  have  led  to  substantial  shut-downs  of  distilling 
facilities  in  the  industry  in Scotland  and  there must  be  concern 
that  there may  be  a  long-term  "product  life cycle"  trend working 
against  Scotch,  reducing  its  share  of  total  alcoholic  beverage 
consumption  in  major  markets  and  with  a  parallel  trend  towards 
increased  proportions  of  bulk  shipments  to  some  major  markets, 
at  the  expense  of  the  product  bottled  in  Scotland. 
The  history  of  whisky  consumption  in  the  Japanese  market  over  a 
similar  period  has  been  somewhat  different.  From  the  various 
statistical  tables  in  Appendix  1  of  this  report,  a  number  of 
significant  conclusions  can  be  drawn: 
Overall  consumption  of  whisky  in  Japan  increased  slowly 
from  1979  to  1983  (average  rate  of  some  4%  per  annum). 
1984  figures  reversed  the  trend,  with  a  sharp  fall  of 
20%. 
Domestic  whisky's  share  of  the  total  increased  steadily 
from  90%  in  1979  to  94%  in  1983  but  fell  back  to  93% 
with  the  1984  transformation. -9-
Sales  of  imported  bottled  Scotch  in  1984  had  fallen  to 
less  than  2/3  of  the  1979  level,  with  share  of  market 
down  from  10%  to  6%. 
Scotch  whisky  can  only  really  compete  in  the  special  grade 
sector  of  the  Japanese  market.  Yet  even  within  this  more 
restricted  framework,  a  deteriorating position has  been  noted: 
Special  grade  sales  as  a  percentage  of  the  total  whisky 
market  have  declined  from  58%  in 1979  to  50%  in 1984. 
The  Scotch  whisky  share  of  the  special  grade  sector  has 
also been  falling,  from  16%  in  1979  to  10%  in  1983.  In 
1984,  however,  there was  a  recovery  up  to  13%,  as  Scotch 
sales  have  not  declined  as  sharply  as  have  those  of 
domestic  brands. 
Another  significant  factor  in  the  Japanese  market  structure  in 
recent  years  has  been  an  overall  movement  down  market;  the  slow 
trend  away  from  special  grade,  noted  above,  has  been  matched  by 
increased  consumption  in  the  very  cheap  second  grade. 
1.2  Wine 
There  are  many  aspects  about  the  recent  perfomance  and  future 
prospects  of  the  European  wine  industry  in  the  Japanese  market 
that are healthy  and  encouraging. 
In  total,  the  wine  market  in  Japan  is  still  relatively  small, 
accounting  for  a  mere  1%  by  volume  of  the  total  Japanese  liquor 
market,  and  represents,  for  example,  only  one  quarter  of  the 
consumption  of whisky. -10-
Encouraging  indications are  that: 
Domestic  unsweetened  fruit  wine  (i.e.  table  wine)  sales 
have  increased by  62%  in  the  six years  since  1979. 
Total  domestic  wine  sales  (including  the  declining 
sweetened  fruit  wine  sector)  have  increased  by  29%  over 
the  same  period. 
Sales  of  imported  bottled  wines  have  increased  by  66% 
over  these  six  years,  increasing  their  share  of  the 
total market  from  22%  - 27%.· 
Most  members  of  the  trade  are  quite  bullish  about  the  future 
prospects  for  wine  sales.  The  current  low  base  is  part  of  the 
reason  for  this;  Japanese  per  capita  wine  consumption  is  less 
than  1  litre  per  annum,  compared  with  24  litres  in  Germany,  80 
litres in France,  8  litres  in  the  U.S.A.  So  growth  rates  of  20 
- 30%  per  annum  are discussed,  with  a  potential  per  capita of  as 
much  as  10  litres  per  annum,  i.e.  more  than  ten  times  the 
current  consumption  level  per head. 
These  optimistic  projections  are  supported  by  evidence  of 
demographic  and  social  changes  in  the  liquor  market.  The 
increasing  role  played  by  young  people,  including girls  and  the 
trend  towards  softer,  blander,  lighter  alcoholic  beverages, 
support  the  case  for  rapid  growth  of wine  consumption. 
As  regards  the  supplying  countries  for  bottled  wines:  for  the 
past  six  years,  France  and  West  Germany  have  between  them 
secured  approximately  80%  of  total bottled  imports.  There  have 
been  minor  fluctuations  over  the  years  and  the  1984  figure  was 
77%  with  the  French  holding 43%  and  the  Germans  34%. !) 
-II-
Among  other  countries,  the  u.s.  is  increasing  its  share 
steadily,  currently  at  7%,  Italian  imports  are  growing  more 
slowly  and  share  is  about  stable  at  6%.  Other  smaller 
quantities are  coming  in  from  Australia  and  Spain. 
As  this  report  was  being  finalised,  the  appearance  of  poisonous 
substances  in wines  sold  in Japan,  both  in  imported bottled wine 
from  West  Germany  and  in  local  wines  containing  imported 
Austrian  bulk,  had  become  an  extremely  public  issue.  It  is 
difficult  to  guage  the  longer  term  effects but  a  few  things  are 
immediately  clear: 
One  local  wine  producer  is  in  serious  trouble, 
particularly  in  terms  of  loss  of public  confidence 
This  may  rub  off on  the  other  local  wine  makers 
The  growth  pattern in wine  sales will be  interrupted,  at 
least  in  the  short  term. 
In  particular,  public  and  consumer  interest  in  issues  of  wine 
labelling  has  been  aroused  and  this  may  well  lend  support  to 
concerns  on  this  front  that  EC  interests  have  been  expressing 
for  some  time. 
1.3  Brandy 
For  the  five  years  1979  - 1983,  brandy  enjoyed  a  rapidly  growing 
market  in  Japan.  In  that  period,  growth  in  total  volume 
amounted  to  76%,  following  a  period  of  relatively  slower  growth 
from  the  beginning  of  the  1970s.  However,  1984  saw  a  downturn, 
with  total  volume  dipping  by  5%. -12-
Within  the  total  market,  domestic  brandies  grew  faster  than 
imports  (almost  doubled  between  1979  and  1983)  and  the  import 
share  of  the  market  total  in  fact  declined  from  34%  to  around 
27%  between  1979  and  1983.  In  1984,  imports  lost  less  ground 
than  domestic  brandies  (less  than  1%  down)  and  their  share 
recovered  to  28.5%.  Sales  of  cognac  have  maintained  their 
market  share  steadily at  around  13%  over  the  period  of  review. 
The  cognac  market  itself  is  dominated  by  two  brands,  which 
according  to  trade  data  share  approximately  three  quarters  of 
the  total  cognac  market  between  them.  Of  the  remaining  brands, 
only  three achieve  any  significant volume. 
2.  Causes  of  the  Low  Level  of  Import  Penetration 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  volume  share  of  bottled  imports  in  the 
total  Japanese  market  for  alcoholic  beverages  over  the  past  six 
years  has  ranged  from  0.8  to  1.0%.  On  this  basis,  it  is 
estimated  that  the  EC  share  of  the  total  market  has  been  between 
0.6  and  0.8%. 
This  must  be  regarded  as 
achievement,  in  particular 
positions  of: 
a  very 
when  one 
unsatisfactory 
considers  the 
level  of 
dominant 
the  Scotch  whisky  manufacturers  in  the  worldwide  whisky 
trade 
the French  cognac  makers  in  the world  trade  in brandy 
French,  German  and  Italian wines 
In  the  course  of  our  studies,  a  number  of  reasons  for  this 
unsatisfactory  performance  have  been  clearly  identified. -13-
In  the  first  place,  we  must  note  the  major  shifts  in  market 
forces  that  have  been  inexorably  and  measurably  taking  place  in 
Japan  over  the  last five  or  six years. 
It is  not  possible  in  this  report  to  provide  a  detailed  picture 
of  these  forces;  the  following  brief  summary  has  resulted  partly 
from  our  discussions  with  interested  parties  in  Japan  and  partly 
from  a  review  of  some  of  the  market  research  into  the  subject 
that  has  been  recently  carried  out. 
The  main  issues are as  follows: 
In  the  firs~ place,  the Japanese  economy  has,  in  the  last 
five  years,  slowed  down  to  modest  growth  rates  of  the 
order  of  3/4%  per annum.  As  part  of  this  process,  growth 
in  consumer  spending  has  been  low  and  the  food  and  drink 
segments  have  been  particularly  sluggish. 
In  particular,  corporate  expense  account  spending  is 
being  more  tightly  controlled,  affecting  both  the  gift 
and  high-class  bar  segments  on  which  Scotch  and  brandy 
are heavily  dependent. 
There  have  been  many  social  changes  at  work,  too.  The 
involvement  of  young  Japanese  in  the  liquor  market  has 
increased  substantially.  There  are  more  working 
teenagers  in  Japan,  their  involvement  with  alcohol  as 
increased  enormously  in  the  last  six  years,  their 
expenditures  on  alcohol  are  rising  and  working  women  and 
working  girls  are  increasingly  participating  in  the 
market. 
As  an  instance  of  the  latter  phenomenon,  whereas  in  the 
overall market  (all ages),  male  consumption  of alcohol  is 
four  times  that  of  females,  in  the  teenage  groups,  the 
split is approximately  50/50. -14-
These  changes  are  exerting  pressures  on  the  whole  liquor 
market,  for  lighter,  sweeter,  lower  alcohol  content  and 
lower  priced  beverages  to  fit  in  with  these  social 
changes.  The  surge  in  Shochu  sales,  which  is  not  a  new 
phenomenon  in  1984  but  has  been  steadily  building  up 
since  about  1979,  is  the  prime  expression  of  these 
underlying  shifts.  The  other  side of  the  coin has  been  a 
move  away  from  the  harder  liquors,  with  a  powerful 
negative  impact  particularly on  the  sale of whisky. 
1984  was  categorised  as  a  year  of  revolution  in  the  Japanese 
liquor markets. 
From  the  evidence  before  us,  we  find  it  diffi~ult to  accept  that 
such  a  revolution  was  solely  or  even  mainly  the  result  of  the 
relatively  minor  liquor  tax  changes  implemented  in  April  1984. 
Those  changes  may  have  acted  as  the  final  trigger;  but  the 
demographic  and  social  changes  at  work  in  the  market  place  have 
not  happened  overnight  and  the  Shochu  revolution probably  started 
back  in  the  late  '70s.  The  build  up  in  Shochu  sales  was  steady 
and  increasing  in  momentum  before  1984,  as  was  the  steady 
stagnation in  the  growth  pattern of whisky. 
Of  particularly  significance  is  the  fact  that  even  the  powerful 
Suntory  has  been  quite unable  to handle  these market  forces.  For 
the year  to March,  1985,  Suntory  sales  value  in total fell by  11% 
from  the  previous  year,  whisky  volume  dropped  26%  while  operating 
profit  plunged  to  43%  of  the  previous  level.  It was  being  said 
by  some  that  an  era  has  ended  for  Suntory  and  that  its  future 
recovery  would  be  built  around  new  products  rather  than  around  a 
re-vitalisation of  the declining whisky  market. 
However,  recent  months  have  produced  the  first  signs  of  a 
recovery  in  whisky  sales  and  some  indications  that  the  shochu 
boom  may  be  running  out  of  steam. - 15  _.!.. 
So  these  are  some  of  the  changing  dynamics  in  the  market  place 
with  which  imports  as  well  as  local  manufacturers  are  having  to 
contend. 
In  addition,  there  is  substantial  evidence  to  indicate  that  the 
position  of  the  imported  product  in  the  Japanese  market  has  been 
undermined  by  a  variety  of  other  factors.  Some  of  these  are 
factors  of a  "regulatory"  nature  in  the  structure of  the Japanese 
market  itself;  others  have  to  do  with  the  organisational 
arrangements  and  marketing  performance  of  the  EC  liquor  industry. 
The  key  regulatory  issues  that  have  been  identified  are  the 
· following: 
The  impact  of  the  Japanese  liquor  tax  system  on  imported 
liquors 
The  impact  of  certain  import  duties 
A number  of  issues  in  the area  of  product  information and 
the  labelling of Japanese  domestic  liquors 
Of  a  somewhat  different  nature  is  the  question  of  parallel 
imports,  which  in  the. view  of  the  trade  have  also  had  a  negative 
impact  on  the  market  penetration  of  Scotch  whisky  and  brandy  in 
Japan. 
The  question  of  retail  price  arrangements  in  the  Japanese  market 
has  also  surfaced  as  an  area of  some  concern. 
Finally,  there are clearly a  number  of  significant areas  in which 
the  business  organisation  and  marketing  performance  of  the 
s~pplier  industries  in  Europe  suggest  opportunities  for 
improvement. 
These  issues  are  all  discussed  and  recommendations  put  forward 
the  following Parts  of  the  report. -16-
PART  C:  LIQUOR  TAX  IN  JAPAN 
1.  Current  Status  of Liquor  Taxes  in  Japan 
The  following  sections described  in detail  the  current  structure, 
levels  and  effects  of  the  liquor  tax  system.  Supporting 
documentation  on  the  subject  of  liquor  tax  is  contained  in 
Appendix  2. 
1.1  Liguor Tax  on  Whisky 
The  Japanese  Liquor  Tax  Law  prescribes  three  grades  of  whisky: 
special,  first  and  second.  English  language  translations  of 
these definitions are  set  out  below: 
Whisky: 
Special  Grade: 
1)  Pure  malt  whisky  or  pure  grain  whisky  (including 
blends  of  pure malt  whisky  and  pure grain whisky). 
2)  Liquors  with  a  pure malt  whisky  or  pure  grain whisky 
content  of  27%  or higher. 
3)  Liquors  with  an  alcoholic  strength  of  43  GL  or 
higher. 
1st Grade: 
1)  Liquors  with  a  pure malt  whisky  or  pure  grain whisky 
content  of  between  17%  and  26%. 
2)  Liquors  with  an  alcoholic  strength  of  40  GL  or 
higher but  under 43  GL. 
2nd  Grade: 
Liquors  which  fall  under neither special nor 1st Grade. -17-
Only  one  standard  has  to  be  satisfied  for  a  product  to be  graded 
and  the highest  possible grading will  always  apply.  For  example 
a  domestic  whisky  with  a  malt  content  of  27%  and  an  alcoholic 
strength  of  only  40  GL  would  be  graded  as  "special".  And  a 
whisky  with  a  17%  malt  content  at 43  GL  would  also  be  a  special 
grade  product. 
It  should  be  noted  that  all  imported  whiskies  and  brandies  are 
automatically  classified  as  "Special  Grade"  unless  it  can  be 
proved  that  the  product  should  be  classified  as  first  or  second 
grade. 
Based  on  this  grad~ng system,  three  seperate  tax structures,  one 
for  each  grade,  have  been  developed. 
Details  of  the  history  and  current  status  of  these  taxes  are 
shown  in Appendix  2.  In  summary: 
For  each  grade  there  is: 
A specific  tax  rate  fixed  at  a  certain number  of 
yen  per  litre  of  volume,  with  increments  for 
increasing alcoholic  strength 
An  ad  valorem  tax  which  replaces  the  specific 
tax  once  stated  "barriers"  of  taxable  value 
(also  expressed  in  yen  per  litre of  volume)  are 
exceeded 
For  second  grade,  the  specific  rate  is ¥296.2  per  litre, 
the barrier ¥570  per litre and  the  ad  valorem  rate 65% 
For  first  grade,  the  specific  rate  is  ¥1,011.4  per 
litre,  the  barrier ¥1,110  per  litre  and  the  ad  valorem 
rate  100% -18-
For  special  grade,  the  specific  rate  is  ¥2,098.1  per 
litre,  the first barrier is at ¥1,400,  introducing an  ad 
valorem  rate  of  150%,  and  a  second  barrier  ¥1,570  per 
litre, with  a  corresponding  ad  valorem  rate of 220%. 
There  are  different  methods  of  calculating  ad  valorem  tax  for 
domestic  and  imported  products.  In  the  case  of  imports,  the  tax 
base  is  usually  taken  as  the  C.I.F.  cost  plus  duty.  For 
domestic  products,  there are  two  methods: 
The  manufacturers' 
excluding  tax,  or 
selling  price  to  wholesalers, 
The  retail  price  less  trade margins  less  tax. 
This  latter  is  officially  described  as  a  "special  case", 
applicable  when  the  retail  price  is  known.  In  practice,  it is 
applied  widely  to  calculation  of  tax  on  domestic  whisky.  (See 
Appendix  2.2) 
Certain  pricing  implications  of  this  method  of  calculating  tax 
will be  examined  at a  later stage  in our  study. 
1.2  Liguor  Tax  on  Brandy 
Brandies,  like  whisky,  are  subdivided  into  three  grades,  on 
exactly  the  same  basis of  classification as whisky. 
The  liquor  tax  structure  for  some  brandy  is also similar: 
There  is  no  difference  between  brandy  and  whisky  as 
regards  the  specific  tax rates. -19-
The  ad  valorem  percentage  rates  are  also  the  same; 
however,  for  brandy,  the  barriers  above  which  the  ad 
valorem  rates  apply  are  significantly  higher  for  the 
220%  ad  valorem  rate. 
The  methods  for  calculating  ad  valorem  tax  for  domestic  and 
imported  products are  the  same  as  for  whisky. 
1.3  Liquor  Tax  for Wine 
Details  of  the history  and  current  status  of  the  liquor  taxes  on 
wines  are  shown  io.  Appendix  2.  They  have  been  amended  four 
times  in  the  last  10  years,  most  recently  in May  1984. 
The  tax  rates  currently  applicable  to  standard  table  wines  are 
as  follows: 
A  specific  tax  at  ¥60.4  per  litre  (¥49. 7  per  litre  if 
C.I.F.  +  Duty  less  than  ¥450/1),  up  to  a  barrier  of 
¥1,020  per  litre.  Once  the  taxable  value  exceeds  this 
barrier,  ad  valorem  tax at  50%  is applied. 
Taxes  for  bottled  imports  are  based  on  the  c. I .F.  cost  plus 
duty;  for  domestic  products,  tax  is  calculated  either  on  the 
manufacturers  selling  price  (excluding  tax)  or  on  the  retail 
price  less  trade margins  less  tax. -20-
1.4  Liquor Tax  on  Liqueurs 
Two  different  rates  of  liquor  tax  are  applied  according  to  the 
C.I.F.  price  and  the  customs  duty. 
a.  Specific  Tax 
When  the  C.I.F.  (+)  duty  cost  is  less  than  ¥1,230  per  litre 
(¥861  per 70cl)  liquor  tax is  charged  as  follows: 
Alcoholic  strength 
of  15%  or higher  and 
extract  of  21%  or 
higher 
Others 
b.  Ad  valorem Tax 
Strength 
15% 
16%  or 
higher 
less  than 
13% 
13%  or 
higher 
Tax  per litre 
¥367 
Addition  of 
¥24.47  per every 
1%  exceeding  15% 
¥117.3 
Addition  of 
¥9.78  per  every 
1%  exceeding  12% 
When  the  C.I.F.  (+)  duty  cost  is more  than  ¥1,230  per  litre 
(¥861  per 70cl)  liquor  tax  is  charged  as  follows: 
Alcoholic  strength 
of  15%  or higher 
and  extract  of  21% 
or higher 
Others 
Tax  barrier between 
specific  tax  and 
ad  valorem  tax  (per  lire) 
When  the  container capacity 
is 
20cl  or  less  ¥1,420 
More  than  20cl  ¥1,230 
20cl  or  less  ¥1,420 
More  than 20cl  ¥1,230 
Tax  rate 
100% 
100% 
50% 
50% -21-
2.  Concerns  Raised  by  EC  Interests 
The  following  conclusions  can  be  drawn  regarding  the  liquor  tax 
as  applied  to whisky: 
The  method  of  assessing  tax is unique,  at  least  as  far as 
major world  markets  are  concerned.  The  method  in all  EC 
countries  (except  Denmark  and  Greece)  and  in  the  U.S .A. 
is  to  levy  on  all spirits a  specific duty,  related  to  the 
volume  of  alcohol  in  the  product. 
The  method  used  in Japan  has  two  clear effects: 
it  generates  three  sharply  defined  product 
categories,  with  very  different  tax  levels  and 
therefore  different  retail  prices.  Taking 
specific  tax  only,  special  grade  whisky  pays 
approximately  twice  as  much  tax  as  first  grade 
and  seven  times  as  much  as  second  grade.  (For 
details,  see  Appendix  2.6) 
the  ad  valorem  component,  based  on  cost, 
effectively  penalises  the  higher quality  (because 
higher cost)  products. 
It  can  thus  be  said  that  the  system  of  grading  and  the 
related  tax  calculation  has  discriminated  sharply  in 
favour  of  the  inferior grades  and  has  created  new  product 
and  price  categories  not  normally  found  in  other  whisky 
markets. -22-
For  brandy,  because  the  systems  of  product  definition  and  tax 
calculation  are  similar  to  whisky,  the  conclusions  must  also  be 
similar.  However,  whereas  in  the  case  of  whisky  the 
classification  or  grading  system  has  produced  three  sharply 
defined  product/price  categories with more  than half  the domestic 
market  in  the  lower  two  classes,  the  brandy  situation  is 
different  and  the  sharp  price  segmentation  has  not  occurred  so 
strongly.  Some  2/3  of  total  brandy  shipments  from  domes tic 
suppliers  have  been  of  special  grade. 
It  is,  however,  true  that  the  ad  valorem  tax  component  does 
penalise high  quality/high  cost  imports  and  places most  cognac  up 
at around  ¥12,000  per bottle retail. 
One  direct result  of  the  tax  and  duty  system  has  been  that  grape 
brandy,  which  is  used  as  a  gift  and  also  in  the  kitchen  for 
cooking  and  retails  at  between  ¥3,500  and  ¥5,000  per  bottle,  is 
losing  market  share  in  face  of  competitively  priced  local 
products  aimed  at  the  same  market  segment. 
As  regards  wine,  there  is  general  agreement  that  the  combined 
impact  of  tax  and  duty  favours  the  domestic  product  at  the  low 
end  of  the  market  (retail  prices  of,  say,  ¥1,200  per  bottle 
downwards),  whereas  the  combination,  because  of  the  method  of 
levying  tax  on  domestic  products,  theoretically  favours  imported 
wines  at retail prices above  this  level  (though  in practice,  very 
little local wine  falls  into this  category). 
A  further  effect  has  been  to  produce  two  clearly  defined  main 
market  segments: 
A cheaper  segment,  mainly  paying  specific duty. 
A  more  expensive  and  very  high  quality  segment,  usually 
paying  the  ad  valorem duty. -23-
European  wines  are  established  in  both  segments.  In  the  upper 
segment,  with  the duty  and  tax  treatment  and  with  obvious quality 
and  image  advantages,  imported  wines,  particularly  French  and  to 
a  lesser  degree  German,  hold  strong  positions.  In  the  lower 
priced  segments,  most  importers  and  in  fact  most  of  the  German 
wine  exporters  are  operating with  some  success,  keeping below  the 
ad  valorem  duty  barrier  and  marketing  their  products  retai  1  at 
around  ¥1,200  - 1,500  per bottle. 
However,  there  are  signs  that  the  future  volume  growth,  in 
take-home  business,  will be  at  the bottom  end  of  the market,  with 
prices at or below ¥1000  per bottle.  It is  here  that  the  future 
growth  of  imported  wine  appears  threatened. 
The  above  comments  have  been  made  on  a  product-by-product basis. 
In  addition,  the  overall  structure  of  the  liquor  tax  is  the 
subject  of  concern,  the  causes  of  which  are  clear  from  the  table 
below: -24-
Product 
The  'Whisky  Category'  (which  includes 
brandy) 
The  minimum  rates  for all whisky  and  brandy  are: 
'Special'  grade  (not  exceeding 43%  vol) 
'First'  grade  ("  "  40%  vol) 
'Second'  grade  ("  "  37%  vol) 
Other  spirits,  eg  vodka,  (not  exceeding 
37  vol) 
Shochu 
Type  A (Ko-rui)  (25%  vol) 
Type  B  (Otsu-rui)  (25%  vol) 
Liqueurs 
"15%  or higher  and  extract  of  21%  or 
higher"  (15%  vol) 
"Other"  (13%  vol) 
Sake 
---.Special'  grade  (16%  vol) 
'First'  grade  (15%  vol) 
'Second'  grade  (15%  vol) 
Synthetic 
Fruit Wine 
"Sugar  content  exceeds  26  g,  or 
extract is  7%  or higher" 
"The  Others" 
"Cheap  and  peculiar  to Japan" 
Sweetened Fruit Wine  (less  than  13%  vol) 
Beer 
Tax 
(y/1) 
2,098.1 
1,011.4 
296.2 
361.8 
78.6 
50.9 
367.0 
117.3 
608.64 
279.5 
107.9 
81.6 
159.8 
60.4 
49.7 
117.3 
239.1 
Note:  Taxes  are  stated  in yen  per  litre of  product. 
Index 
(Special  Grade 
whisky  •  100) 
100 
48 
14 
17 
4 
2 
17 
6 
29 
13 
5 
4 
8 
3 
2 
6 
11 -25-
As  is  clear  from  this  tabulation,  special  grade  whiskies  and 
brandies  are particularly heavily  taxed.  To  quote  some  examples, 
the minimum  rate  for  special  grade  whisky  is: 
41  times  the  rate  on  shochu  (Otsu-rui) 
27  times  the  rate  on  shochu  (Ko-rui) 
7  times  the  rate  on  2nd  grade whisky 
twice  the  rate  on  1st  grade whisky 
To  sum  up:  the  main  areas  of  concern,  which  are  regarded  as 
distorting  the  patterns  of  trade  and  of  consumer  demand  for 
liquors  and  obstructing  the  natural  flow  of  imports  of  liquors 
into Japan  are: 
The  system  of  tax barriers  and  ad  valorem  tax  structures 
as it affects all  imported  liquors. 
The  three  different  levels  of  tax  applied  to  the  three 
grades  of whisky  and  brandy  as  defined. 
The  overall  levels  of  tax  paid  on  the  entire  range  of 
liquors,  in  particular  the  highly  favoured  treatment  of 
shochu  compared  with  other beverages. 
3.  Liquor  Tax  in Major  Overseas Markets 
To  provide  one  possible  framework  for  reviewing  the  existing 
Japanese  liquor  tax  structure,  we  have  examined  the  structures in 
comparable  developed  economies  overseas,  i.e.  the major  countries 
of  the  EC  and  the u.s.A. 
The  position  can  be  summarised  as  follows;  full  details  of  the 
relevant  overseas  tax  structures  are  set  out  in  documents 
included  in Appendix 4. -26-
EC  Countries 
In  the main,  liquor  taxes  in  EC  countries are  levied  as  follows: 
On  spirits,  as  a  specific  tax per  volume  of  pure alcohol. 
In  the major  EC  countries  (France,  Germany,  Italy,  U.K.), 
taxes  on  most  spirits are  at  the  same  absolute  level;  in 
Germany,  in  particular,  all  spirits  pay  the  same  amount 
of  liquor  tax per volume  of  pure alcohol. 
On  wine,  no  tax  is  raised  in  Germany,  Italy  or  Greece. 
In  other countries,  tax  is charged at a  specific rate per 
volume  of  p-roduct,  in  most  of  these  countries  with  one 
rate  for  wines  up  to  15%  alcohol  and  a  higher  rate  for 
those  above  15%. 
For beer,  taxes  in major  EC  countries  are also charged  at 
a  specific  rate  per  volume  of  finished  product  or  at  an 
intermediate  stage of  production.  In  each  case,  the  rate 
normally  increases with  increasing alcoholic  strength. 
The  underlying  principle  is  clearly  to  relate  the  amount  of  tax 
paid  to  the  amount  of  alcohol  in  the  product,  either,  in  the  case 
of  spirits,  by  a  direct  relationship  or,  with  wine  and  beer,  by 
adjusting  the  tax  rate as  alcoholic  strength  increases. 
In  no  major  EC  market  are  ad  valorem  taxes  raised  on  alcoholic 
beverages.  In  fact,  the  only  markets  in  the  EC  where  ad  valorem 
liquor  taxes  are  found  at  all  are  Greece  and  Denmark,  which 
represent  a  small  proportion  of  EC  production. 
U.S.A. 
The  tax  structure  in  the  U.S.A.  is  almost  identical  in  principle 
with  that  of  the major  EC  countries: (3) 
-27-
All  distilled  spirits  pay  a  standard  specific  tax  of 
$10. 50  on  each  proof  gallon  (this  to  be  increased  to 
$12.50  on  October  1st 1985). 
On  wines  not  more  than  24%  alcohol  by  volume,  taxes  are 
charged  at  specific  rates  per  wine  gallon,  the  rates 
increasing  as  the  percent  of  alcohol  increases. 
Champagne  and  other  sparkling wines  are  taxed  on  the  same 
basis  but  at  higher  rates.  Wines  with  more  than  24% 
alcohol  by  volume  are  taxed  as distilled spirits. 
On  beer  (with  minor  exceptions),  a  fixed  specific  tax  is 
charged  per_.volume  of  product. 
As  in  the  EC  countries,  it is again noteworthy  that all the  taxes 
in  the u.s.  are  specific,  related  (except  in  the  case of beer)  to 
volume  of alcohol.  There  are no  ad  valorem  taxes  in  the  relevant 
parts  of  the  U.S.  system. 
4.  Possible Directions  of  Change 
4.1  Objectives  and  Criteria 
We  have  described  in  a  previous  section  the  ways  in  which  the 
current  Japanese  liquor  tax  system  appears  to  distort  the 
patterns of  consumer  purchase;  we  have  also described  the  liquor 
tax  systems  used  in  EC  countries  and  the U.S. 
In  proposing  possible  alterations  to  the  current  Japanese 
system,  our  prime  objective was  to  remove  discrimination,  within 
each  category,  between  domestic  and  imported  products.  To  this 
end,  specific  sub-objectives were: -28-
To  simplify  the  system  and,  where  possible,  to  follow 
the  principles  applied  in  major  developed  economies 
overseas 
To  remove  specific  anomalies,  for  example  the 
disproportionately  low  rate  of  tax  currently  charged  on 
shochu  compared  with  other distilled spirits 
To  remove  the  three-level  tax  system  currently  applied 
to  whisky  and  brandy.  This  method  of  taxing  in  three 
classes  was  first  introduced  for  sake  in  1949.  The 
subsequent  extension  of  this  system  applied  only  to 
whisky  and  brandy,  not  to  other  spirits  (e. g.  shochu), 
fruit wine,  sweetened wines,  etc. 
To  remove  ad  valorem  taxes  from  the  system. 
view,  these  taxes  create  specific  problems: 
In  our 
they  are,  in  effect,  a  tax  on  quality  and  widen 
the  price  gap  between  high  cost/high  quality 
products  and  low  quality products 
on  imported  products,  they  impose  a  tax  on 
import  duty,  as  duty  forms  part  of  the  taxable 
base 
the  system  leads  to  manipulation  by  local 
producers  and  importers,  to  position  their 
products  below  the  tax barrier. 
air  freighting  of  high  quality  wines  can  become 
uneconomic  with  high  ad  valorem  duties  charged 
on  the air freight  cost. -29-
It  is  also  noted  that  no  advanced  country  overseas  has 
ad  valorem  taxes  on  liquors.  They  appear  to  be  mainly 
used  in  developing  countries  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting fledgling  local  industries. 
It would  obviously be  important  to  ensure  to  the extent  possible 
the maintenance  of  overall  government  revenues  from  liquor  tax. 
It  is  noted  that  liquor  taxes  are  a  high  proportion  of 
government  revenues  in  Japan  (6.1%,  compared  with  1.4%  in  the 
U.S.A.  and  1.9%  in  West  Germany).  However,  given  the  need  to 
reduce  government  deficit  financing,  it would  be  inappropriate 
for  the  contribution  from  the  liquor  tax  to  be  reduced  at  this 
stage. 
In  drafting  our  proposals,  we  have  also  studied  carefully  the 
"Statement  of  Demands  Concerning  Liquor  Tax  and  Other  Matters" 
presented  by  the  Japan Spirits  and  Liquors  Makers  Association  to 
the  President  of  the  LDP  Tax  Administration  Research  Committee 
on  September  29th  1984.  As  will  be  shown  later  in  this  report, 
our  proposals  appear  to  respond  very  closely  to  the  demands  of 
this Association. 
4.2  Tax  Structure 
Two  specific proposals  are made: 
First,  there  should  be  five  basic  groups  of  liquor  for  tax 
purposes.  This  represents  a  significant  simplification  compared 
with  the  current  10  groups. -30-
The  proposed  groups  are: 
Sake  (including synthetic  sake  and  mirin) 
Spirits  (including  the  existing  shochu,  whisky  and 
spirits categories  and  derivatives) 
Wine  (both  fruit  and  sweetened wine  and  derivatives) 
Liqueur  (the existing group) 
Beer 
As  indicated  in  section  3  above,  liquors  in  the  EC  and  U.S. 
markets  are  divided  into  three  groups:  spirits,  wine  and  beer, 
for  tax  purposes.  It  seems  appropriate  to  increase  the  number 
of groups  to five  in  the Japanese  case because: 
Sake  is  a  unique  product,  not  to  be  combined  with  other 
groups  of  liquor 
The  "liqueurs"  specification  in  Japan  contains  a  wide 
variety  of  substances  which  it  would  be  difficult  to 
combine  logically with  any  other group 
This  classification  would,  among  other  things,  remove  an 
existing  anamoly  whereby  the  indigenous  product  shochu  pays  far 
less  tax  than  vodka,  though  the  two  are,  for  all  practical 
purposes,  the  same  product. 
Second,  the  principle  for  levying  taxes  should  be  that  of 
charging  specific  taxes  related  either  to  the  volume  of  alcohol 
or  in  one  specific  case  to  the  volume  of  product.  Wherever 
feasible,  a  single  standard  level  of  tax is proposed  for  each  of 
the  five major groups. -31-
4.3  Detailed Proposals 
In  order  to  develop  specific  tax  proposals,  the  following 
methodology  was  adopted  for  each  of  the  proposed  five  liquor 
groups: 
For  the  two  calendar years  1983  and  1984,  using National 
Tax  Administration  Agency  data,  the  total  volume  of 
product  cleared  and  the  total  tax  levied  for  the  group 
was  calculated 
The  equivalent  volume  of  alcohol  for  each  product  was 
calculated. 
The  average  tax  per  kilolitre  of  product  and  per 
kilolitre of alcohol  were  obtained. 
The  effective  tax  rates  per kilolitre of  alcohol  for  the 
group  for  the  two  years  were  used  as  a  basis  for 
proposing  the  new  tax  levels. 
Using  this  methodology,  the  following  detailed  results  and 
proposals  were  obtained: -32-
4.3.1  Spirits 
The  calculation  based  on  National  Tax  Administration  Agency 
data  for  the  1984  calendar year is set  out  in  the  table below: 
Spirits 
(based  on  1984  calendar year) 
¥Tax  per 
Product  Alcohol  YMn 
Product  (kl)  (kl)  Tax  kl/:erod.  kl/alc. 
Whisky  305,230  126,060  388,064  1,271,382  3,078,407 
Brandy  22,772  9,405  41,079  1,803,926  4,367,783 
Spirits  40,710  19,541  12, 130  297,961  620 '746 
Shochu  543,333  135,833  38,394  70,664  282,656 
Total  912,045  290,839  479,667  525,924  1,649,253 
Thus  the  average  tax  per  litre  of  alcohol  for  the  spirits 
group  as  defined  in  1984  was  ¥1,649.3. 
Carrying  out  the  same  calculation  for  1983,  the  resultant  tax 
per  litre of  alcohol  was  ¥1,900.6.  The  reason  for  the decline 
in  1984  was,  of  course,  the  increase  in  volume  sold  of  lowly 
taxed  shochu. 
As  overall  liquor  tax  revenues  declined  in  1984,  mainly 
because  of  the  shochu  boom,  it may  be  considered  prudent  to 
aim  to  recover  some  of  this  tax  by  setting  the  new  tax  at  a 
rate of,  say,  ¥1,850  per litre of  pure  alcohol  for  the spirits 
group.  If  consumption  remained  on  the  1984  pattern,  revenues 
would  increase by  some  ¥58  billion. -33-
The  table  below  shows  the  effects  of  the  proposed  tax  in  Yen 
per kilolitre of  product,  compared  with  the  existing  specific 
taxes. 
Product 
Spirits 
Comparison  of  existing and  proposed  tax  levels 
(Yen/kl  of  product) 
Existing  Proposed 
specific  tax  tax 
Whisky/brandy:  Special  grade  2,098,100  795,500 
1st grade  1,011,400  740,000 
2nd  grade  296,200  684,500 
Shochu:  Ko  (25%)  78,600  462,500 
(20%)  56,600  370,000 
Otsu  (25%)  50,900  462,500 
Other spirits  Similar  to whisky/brandy 
A new  tax  on  these  lines would  have  two  clear effects: 
It  drastically  narrows  the  gap  between  the  three 
grades  of  whisky/brandy,  thus  removing  one  of  the 
major  concerns  of  importers  and  one  of  the  major 
perceived  anomalies  in  the  existing  tax structure. 
It  also  significantly  raises  the  tax  level  on  both 
types  of  shochu,  thereby  meeting  one  of  the  main 
concerns  of  the  local manufacturers. -34-
Taking  normal  distributor  and  trade  margins,  the  approximate 
effects at retail level  of  the  proposed  tax  changes  per 750  ml 
bottle would  be: 
Special  grade whisky  reduced  by  ¥1,740 
First grade whisky  reduced  by  ¥360 
Second  grade whisky  increased by  ¥520 
Shochu  (Ko-type  20%)  increased by  ¥420 
So,  for  example,  a  720  ml  bottle of Jin Soft  Shochu,  currently 
retailing for ¥520,  would  increase  to around  ¥920. 
4.3.2  Wine 
The  calculations  for wine  for  the  1984  calendar year are  shown 
in  the  table below: 
Wine 
(Based  on  1984  calendar year) 
Product  Alcohol  YMIO  ¥Tax 
Product  (kl)  (kl)  Tax 
kl/prod.  kl/alc. 
Fruit wine  (11%)  74,551  8,200  7,578  101,649  924,146 
Sweetened  wine 
(16%)  16,431  2,629  2,311  140,649  879,084 
Total  90,982  10,829  9,887  108,692  913,196 -35-
On  the  basis  of  1984  data,  the  average  achieved  tax  per  litre 
of alcohol  was  ¥913.2. 
For  comparison,  the  calculation  was  done  for  1983  but  the 
achieved  tax per kilolitre of alcohol  was  in all cases  lower. 
For  fiscal  prudence,  it  is  therefore  proposed  that  the  1984 
figures  could  be  used  as  the basis  for  a  proposed  new  tax. 
A new  tax  could  therefore  be  proposed  at  the  rate  of ¥925  per 
litre of  pure  alcohol. 
On  the  basis  of  1984  consumption  levels,  the  tax  revenue  on 
this basis will !ncrease by  some  ¥130  million. 
Comparing  the effective  taxes  per kilolitre of  product: 
A  fruit  wine  of  alcoholic  strength  11%  (average  for 
this  class)  would  pay  ¥101,750  per kilolitre,  compared 
with  current  rates  of  ¥159,800,  ¥60,400  or  ¥49,700, 
depending  on  the  product  specification. 
A sweetened wine  at  16%  alcohol  would  pay  ¥148,000  per 
kilolitre,  compared  with  the  current ¥156,400. 
It  is  difficult  to  specify  in  detail  the  effects  on  retail 
prices because  of  the wide  variety of  products  on  the market. 
For  fruit  wine,  the  most  significant  category,  the  overall 
effect would  be  to  increase marginally  (by  less  than  ¥100  per 
750  ml  bottle)  retail  prices  for  the  lowest  price  wines; 
prices  currently  at  or  above  ¥2,500  per  bottle  would  be 
noticeably  reduced,  mainly  because  of  the  elimination  of  the 
ad  valorem  tax on  higher  priced wines. -36-
Note:  As  an  alternative  to  a  tax  on  wine  based  on  volume  of 
alcohol,  a  tax  on  volume  of  product  could  be  proposed,  as  this 
is  the  structure  in  EC  countries  and  the  U.S.  In  this  case, 
based  on  the  1984  tax  data,  taxes  of  ¥110  per  litre  (up  to 
15%)  and  ¥150  per litre (over  15%)  could  be  appropriate. 
4.3.3  Sake 
The  calculations,  using  the  same  method,  are  set  out  in  the 
following  table: 
Sake  and  Mirin 
(based  on  1984  calendar year) 
Product  Alcohol  Tax  ¥Tax 
Product  (kl)  (kl)  YMIO 
kl/prod.  kl/alc. 
Sake  (15.9%)  1,368,905  217,656  269,185  196,643  1,236,745 
Mirin  (13.5%)  75,880  10,244  5,584  73,590  545' 100 
Total  1,444,785  227,900  274,769  190,180  1,205,656 
The  figures  for  1983  produced  a  lower  rate  of  tax  per 
kilolitre of  alcohol. 
It is  therefore  proposed  that  the  overall  rate  of  ¥1,210  per 
litre of alcohol  could  be  applied. -37-
The  result  would  be  to  produce  no  noticeable  change  in  the 
average  retail  price  of  sake.  However,  the  price  gap  between 
special,  first  and  second  grades  would  be  narrowed  because, 
under  the  proposed  system,  the  tax  variation  between  grades 
would  be  very  greatly  reduced. 
4.3.4  Liqueurs 
For  this  very  small  group,  in  terms  of  volume  consumed  and  tax 
raised,  the  effective  tax  per  litre  of  alcohol  in  1984  was 
¥676.7.  It  is  proposed  that  a  rate  of  ¥680  per  litre  of 
alcohol  be  adopted  for  this  highly  diversified  product  group. 
(Note:  some  mix  products  currently  in  this  category,  such  as 
chu-hai,  would  be  re-classified,  following  these  proposals, 
according  to  their  derivation,  eg.  "spirits-based"  classified 
as  spirits). 
4.3.5  Beer 
Beer  is  not  a  major  subject  for  study  in  this  project.  As 
regards  tax,  there  would  appear  to  be  no  reason  to  alter  the 
existing  tax  level  of ¥239.1  per  litre of beer. 
5.  Comments  on  Likely  Effects  of  the  Changes 
5.1  Fiscal Effects 
In  attempting  to  assess  possible  fiscal  effects  of  a  proposed 
new  tax  structure  on  the  above  lines,  it  should  be  noted  that, 
of  the  total  liquor  tax  revenue,  some  98%  comes  from  taxes  on 
beer,  whisky,  sake,  brandy  and  shochu. 
key  items  to be  considered. 
These  are,  therefore, -38-
Of  these  key  items,  there  seems  no  reason  why,  purely  as  a 
result  of  the  proposed  tax  changes,  there  s~ould be  any  change 
in  the  trends  of  consumption  of  either beer  or  sake.  Their  tax 
levels  are  not  significantly  affected  by  the  changes,  whereas 
the  tax  levels  and  prices  of most  other  lower  priced  products  in 
the  structure would  increase.  For beer and  sake,  therefore,  the 
fiscal  risks appear  to be  negligible. 
As  regards  shochu,  which  is  one  of  the  most  adversely  affected 
products  under  the  proposed  new  structure,  there is likely to be 
a  significant  reduction  in  sales  volume.  However,  given  the 
structure of  the  suggested  tax changes,  shochu  volume  would  need 
to  drop  to  below  15%  of  its  current  level  for  tax  revenues  to 
actually  decline.  This  seems  highly  unlikely.  If,  in  fact, 
shochu  volumes  fell  to  about  half  the  1984  level,  that  is  down 
to  the  volume  of  the  period  1979  to  1982  prior  to  the  recent 
shochu  boom,  tax  on  shochu  under  the  proposed  new  rates  would 
increase by  some  ¥70  - ¥80  billion per year. 
The  critical remaining question is:  what  would  happen  to whisky 
and  brandy  under  the  proposed  new  structure?  This  is  almost 
impossible  to  predict.  However,  if  total  whisky  consumption 
recovered  from  the  low  of  1984  back  to  the  level  of,  say,  1983 
(before  the  shochu  boom),  then  the  loss  of  tax on  whisky  because 
of  lower  rates  for  special  and  first  grades  would  be 
approximately  equal  to  the  likely  gains  from  shochu  taxes  as 
assessed  above. 
There  seems,  therefore,  to  be  a  basic  case  for  arguing  that  the 
likely  overall  fiscal  effect  of  taxes  along  the  lines  suggested 
would  tend  to be  close  to neutral. -39-
5.2  Effects  on  Local Spirits and  Liquor Manufacturers 
The  Japan  Spirits  and  Liquor  Makers  Association,  in  their 
"Statement  of  Demands  Concerning  Liquor  Tax  and  Other  Matters" 
of September  29th  1984,  made  a  series  of  demands  in  relation  to 
liquor  tax.  As  will  be  seen  from  the  following  comments,  all 
the  demands  made  by  the  Association  in  respect  of  liquor  tax 
are,  in fact,  met  by  the  proposals made  above  in  this  report. 
Demand  I  was  concerned  with  the  correction  of  disproportionate 
liquor  tax  laws  on  spirits  and  liquors.  The  prime  concern  was 
with  the  high  levels  of  tax  imposed  on  whisky,  particularly 
special  grade  and  the  very  low  levels  of  tax  paid  by  other 
spirits,  in  particular  by  shochu.  The  above  proposals,  which 
significantly  reduce  the  tax  amounts  on  special  and  first  grade 
whisky  and  increase  the  tax  amounts  on  shochu,  should  go  a  long 
way  towards  eliminating  the  anomalies  and  distortions  in  the 
market  place discussed  in  the  Statement. 
Demand  II is  concerned  to  correct  the alleged  unequal  assessment 
standards  for  domestic vs.  imported  liquors.  Under  this demand, 
the  claim  is made  that  domestically  produced  spirits  pay  tax  on 
advertising  expenses,  administrative  and  other  expenses  whereas 
the  imported  products  do  not.  This  concern  of  the  local  makers 
only arises  because  of  the  existence  of  ad  valorem  taxes  in  the 
liquor  tax  structure. 
taxes  would  be  removed 
Under  the  above  proposals,  ad  valor  em 
from  the  structure;  so  the  alleged 
unequal  assessment  standards  claimed  by  the  local  producers 
would  no  longer exist. -40-
Demand  III  is  concerned  with  the  classification  of  spirits  and 
liquors  and  seems,  like  Demand  I,  to  be  directed  mainly  towards 
reducing  tax  load  differentials  by  simplification  and 
rationalisation  of  the  system.  The  proposals  made  in  this 
report  achieve  a  significant  simplification  of  the  liquor 
classification  system,  in  particular  by  including  all  spirits, 
including  shochu,  whisky  and  brandy,  under  the  same 
classification.  The  quoted  differential  between  the  tax  on 
spirits  and  that  on  shochu  would  largely  disappear  under  the 
proposals made  above. 
Demand  IV  addresses  the  application  of  proportionally 
diminishing  tax  rates  related  to  the  alcoholic  content  of  the 
product.  Our  proposals  would  involve  (for  all  products  except 
beer)  introduction  of  taxes  at  a  specific  rate  per  volume  of 
alcohol  in  the  product.  Thus,  in  all  cases,  the  tax  would 
increase  or  decrease  in  direct  proportion  to  the  alcoholic 
content.  In  this  way,  the  problems  identified  under  Demand  IV 
would  be  overcome. 
Demand  V is  concerned  with  aspects  of  the  administration  of  the 
liquor  tax  and  the  changes  requested  seem  perfectly  reasonable. 
The  other  demands  in  the  paper  are  concerned  with  questions 
related  to  customs  duties. 
Thus  it  would  appear  that  the  key  issues  addressed  by  the 
Association  in  its  paper,  as  far  as  liquo.r  tax  is  concerned, 
would  be  effectively  addressed  and  the  anomalies  and  problems 
would  be  eliminated  by  the  adoption  of  the  tax  proposals  that 
have  been  put  forward  in  this  report. -41-
5.3  Combined  Tax  and  Duty  Burden 
Part  D  of  the  report  examines  import  duties  and  suggests 
possible directions  of  change. 
Tke  combined  effects  of  proposed  tax  and  duty  changes  must  also 
be  assessed  and  this  is done  below  in Part D,  section 5.2. -42-
PART  D:  IMPORT  DUTIES  ON  LIQUORS 
1.  Current  Status  of  Import  Duties  on  Liquors 
The  tables  in  Appendix  3  set  out  in  detail  the  current  import 
duties  levied  on  imports  of  liquors  entering  Japan  and  the  new 
rates  announced  on  June  25th  1985  to be  introduced  as  part of  the 
"Action Programme".  Also  given  in  that  Appendix  are  tabulation• 
showing  the historical  trends  in  these duties. 
New  duty  rates  on  major  products  are  planned  to  be  introduced  as 
follows: 
Whisky  and  brandy  (bulk  and  bottled)  as  soon  as  possible 
in 1986  and  certainly before April  1. 
Still wine  (bulk  and  bottled)  by  April  1,  1987. 
The  position  product  by  product,  is  summarised  briefly  below. 
Current  duties  are  shown  first,  with  the  new  duties  in  brackets 
following: 
Whisky 
As  shown  in  the  tables  in Appendix  3,  duties  on  imports  of  Scotch 
whisky  are as  follows: 
For bulk,  ¥370  per  litre  (¥296  per  litre) 
For  bottled,  a  range  from  ¥299  to  ¥332  per  litre, 
calculated  within  this  range  on  the  basis  of  36%  ad 
valorem  (¥246.40  per litre) (4) 
-43 _. 
Thus,  at  the  current  rates,  the  bulk  duty  rate  is  nominally 
between  11%  and  24%  higher  than  the  rate  for  bottled  whisky. 
However,  after allowing  for  the "dilution factor"  for bulk,  which 
is  usually  imported  at  around  60  GL,  the  actual  bulk  rate  per 
litre is ¥265  or between  11%  and  20%  below  the bottled rate. 
Wine 
Duties  on  imports  of still wines  are  levied as  follows: 
Bulk wine 
Standard  rate  ¥80/1  (¥64/1);  preferential  (GSP)  rate 
¥30/1  (¥24/1) 
Bottled wine 
A  range  from  ¥166/1  up  to ¥280/1,  with  the  actual  amount 
within  this  range  calculated  on  the  basis  of  38%  ad 
valorem  (a  range  from  ¥132.80/1  to ¥224/1,  calculated  at 
30.4%  ad  valorem). 
Prior  to  the  Action  Programme,  changes  in  wine  duties  were 
introduced  in April  1985.  The  effects  of  these  changes  on  most 
bottled  wine  duties  can  be  shown  to  be  minimal.  On  the  other 
hand  the  reduction  of  the  standard  and  already  low  preferential 
rates  on  bulk wines  significantly reduced  the  costs  of  local wine 
bottlers  using  imported  bulk.  As  bulk  imports  can  comprise  as 
much  as  95%  of  the  ingredients  of  wines  bottled  in  Japan,  the 
saving was  clearly  important. 
Brandy 
As  shown  in  the  tables  in Appendix  3,  duties  on  imports  of brandy 
are as  follows: 
For bulk,  ¥345/1  (¥276/1) 
For bottled,  ¥407/1  (¥325.60/1) -44-
Thus  there  is  a  fixed  differential  of  ¥62  (¥49.60)  per  litre  in 
favour  of  bulk. 
2.  Summary  of Action  Programme  Changes 
The  table  below  summarises  the  changes  in  duty,  under  the  Action 
Programme,  affecting  the major  EC  bottled  imports: 
Tariff 
Product 
Existing  New 
Scotch Whisky  (bottled)  ¥299-332/litre  ¥246.40/litre 
(basis  36% 
ad  val) 
Wine  from  fresh  grapes  ¥166-280/litre  ¥132.80-224/ 
(bottled)  (basis  38%  litre 
ad  val)  (basis  30.4% 
ad  val) 
Brandy  (bottled)  ¥407/litre  ¥325.6/litre 
3.  Concerns  Raised  by  EC  Interests 
Our  interviews  with  EC  liquor  interests  have  identified  the 
following  areas  in  which  they  regard  Japanese  import  duties  as 
discriminating against  European  liquors: 
In  the  first  place,  they  regard  the  general  level  of 
Japanese  import  duties  on  liquors  as  high  and 
significantly  higher  than  those  applicable  to  Japanese 
imports  into  EC  markets. -45-
Scotch  is  treated  unfavourably  compared  with  Bourbon  or 
rye  whisky  imports,  which  pay  ad  valorem duties  of 24.5% 
and  28%  respectively  (estimated  as  approximately  half 
the  amount  paid  on  standard  Scotch). 
The  gap  between  duty  on  bottled  table  wines  and  bulk 
table  wines  is  wide  and  became  wider  with  the  duty 
changes  of  April  1985.  In  the  worst  case,  bottled 
imports  can  pay  over  nine  times  the  duty  on  bulk 
imported at  the  preferential  rate. 
The  June  25th  announcement  provides  minimal  help  in  these  areas 
and  in  one  aspect  penalises  EC  imports  further.  As  will  be 
shown  below,  a  20%  cut  makes  little  impact  on  the  gap  between 
Japanese  and  EC  duties;  while  the  changes  perpetuate  the  Scotch 
disadvantage  versus  bourbon  and  rye. 
4.  Comparison  of  Japanese  and  EC  Import  Duties  on  Liquors 
In  the  course  of  the  study,  the  consultants  have  made  detailed 
comparisons  between  the  duties  on  imports  of  liquor  coming  into 
Japan  from  EC  suppliers  and  those entering  EC  markets  from  third 
country  sources.  In  Appendix  5,  documents  are  included  setting 
out  the  relevant  import  duty  rates  for  imported  liquors  into  EC 
and  U.S.  markets,  and  in  Appendix  5.2,  a  comparative  table  of 
Japanese/EC duties  is given. 
~:  In ·converting  overseas  duty  rates  into  equivalent  yen 
rates,  the  following  exchange  rates have  been  used: 
1  ECU  = ¥185 
US$1  = ¥250 -46-
From  this  analysis,  the  following  picture  of  Japanese  and  EC 
duties  can be  presented: 
Whisky 
Bourbon 
On  bottled whisky,  Japanese  imports  into  EC  countries 
would  pay  ¥46.25  per  litre while  imports  into  Japan 
pay  from  ¥299  to  ¥332  per  litre.  Thus  the  Japanese 
tariff is 6.5  to 7.2  times  higher  than  the  EC  one. 
On  bulk,  the  EC  duty  is  ¥39.77  per  litre,  the 
Japanese duty ¥370  per litre.  Thus  the Japanese duty 
is 9.3  times  higher. 
The  relationship  between  the  tariff  on  bottled  and 
that  on  bulk whisky,  after allowing  for  dilution,  is 
approximately  the  same  in  both  the  Japanese  and  EC 
cases. 
On  bottled bourbon,  the  EC  duty  is ¥44.66  per litre while  the 
Japanese  duty  at  24.5%  ad  valorem  is  estimated  to  be  around 
¥150  per  litre.  The  Japanese  duty  is  3.5  times  higher  than 
the  EC  equivalent. 
Whisky/Bourbon 
In  the  EC,  the  duties  on  imported  bottled  whisky 
(Scotch)  and  Bourbon  are  almost  identical$  the 
difference is only  4%. 
In Japan,  the duty  on  Scotch  is around  twice  the duty 
on  Bourbon. Brandy 
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On  bottled  brandy,  the  Japanese  duty  at  ¥407  per 
litre is 2.8  times  the  EC  duty at ¥145.78  per  litre 
On  bulk brandy,  the Japanese  duty  is 2.7  times  the  EC 
duty. 
Sparkling Wine 
The  EC  duty  on  bottled  sparkling  wine  is  ¥74.00  per 
litre. 
The  Japanese  equivalent  is  ¥360  per  litre  or  4.9 
times  greater. 
Table Wine  Not  More  Than  13%  Bottled 
The  EC  rate is ¥26.83  per  litre. 
The  Japanese  rate  ranges  from  ¥166  to  ¥280  per  litre, 
which  is  between  6.2  and  10.4  times  higher  than  the 
European  level. 
Wine  Not  More  Than  13%  Bulk 
The  EC  duty  is ¥20.17  per  litre. 
The  Japanese  duty  ranges  from  ¥30  to  ¥80  per  litre 
depending  on  country  of  origin.  The  Japanese  rate is 
thus  1.5  to 4.0  times  greater. -48-
Bottled Wine/Bulk Wine 
In  the  EC  tariff, bottled  table wine  not  more  than  13% 
pays  a  tariff  approximately  1/3  higher  than  the 
equivalent bulk. 
In  Japan,  the  duty  on  bottled  table  wine  imports  is 
between 5.5  and  9.3  times  higher  than  the preferential 
bulk  rate  and  between  2.1  and  3.5  times  the  standard 
rate. 
Suuanarising  this  analysis,  the  key  areas  of  concern  are  the 
following: 
In  the first place,  the overall  levels  of Japanese duties 
on  bottled  imports  are between  three  and  ten  times  higher 
than  the  EC  equivalent duties. 
The  combination  of  these  relatively  high  import  duties 
with  ad  valorem  liquor  taxes  produces  high  multiplier 
effects  on  the  total  duty-plus-tax  paid  by  the  higher 
quality  imports.  In effect,  a  tax is  paid  upon  a  tax. 
The  huge  gap  in  duty  between  bottled  and  bulk  table wine 
imports  is  regarded  as  inequitable.  It enables  Japanese 
bottlers  (whose  products  can  legally  contain  as  much  as 
95%  imported  bulk)  to  land  their  raw  materials  paying 
duties  between  six  and  ten  times  lower  than  those  levied 
on  bottled  imports. 
The  relatively  wide  differential  between  the  Japanese 
tariff  on  whisky  compared  with  bourbon  is  regarded  as 
unnecessary  discrimination against  Scotch whisky. -49-
The  June  25th  announcement  will  only  reduce  the  Japan/EC  duty  gap 
to  80%  of  the  present  level.  Thus,  overall  duty  levels  on 
bottled  imports  will,  from  April  1987,  still be  between  2.2  and 
8.3  times  higher  than  EC  equivalents;  and  the  gap  between bottled 
and  bulk  wine  duty  will  widen  marginally  for  the  period  April 
1986  to April  1987. 
Note:  Reviewing  U.S.  import  duties  in  a  similar  manner,  it is 
found  that: 
U.S.  d~ties  on  imported  bottled  table  wine  are  very 
similar to  those  in  the  EC. 
Duties  on  bulk  table  wine  are  slightly higher  than  those 
on  bottled,  thus  giving  a  duty  advantage  to  the  bottled 
product  (the  reverse  of  the Japanese  situation). 
U.S.  duties  on  sparkling  wine  are  very  similar  to  those 
in  EC  countries. 
U.S.  duty  on  imported  Scotch whisky  is about  one  third  of 
the  EC  rate;  this  makes  the  current  Japanese  whisky 
duties between  19  and  21  times  the  U.S.  equivalent. 
Another,  possibly  more  relevant,  comparison  can  be  made  between 
the  duties  imposed  on  those  products  that  are  locally  made, 
because  in most  cases  these  products  bear  the  higher  duty  rates; 
for  example,  Japan  imposes  higher  duties  on  Scotch  than  it does 
on  rye  or bourbon,  so  does  the  EC  (though  the  gap  is very  small), 
while  in  the U.S.  the  reverse  is  the  case. 
If we  compare,  in  the  field  of  whisky/bourbon/rye,  the  higher  or 
'protective'  duties  imposed  in  each  country,  the  position  is  as 
follows: -50-
Japanese  duty  on  bottled Scotch 
EC  duty  on  bottled  Scotch 
U.S.  duty  on  bottled bourbon 
¥/litre 
299  - 332 
46.25 
19.16 
Thus  the Japanese  duty  is 6.5  to  7.2  times  the  EC  level  and  15.6 
to 17.3  times  the U.S.  level. 
It can  be  concluded  that,  examined  from  various  angles,  Japanese 
import  duties  on  the  key  liquor  products  are  invariably  far 
higher  than  the  comparable  imposts  in  the  EC  or  the U.S. 
On  this  basis,  a  number  of  specific  proposals  will  be  developed 
in  the next  section of  this  report. 
S.  Possible Directions  of Change 
In  considering  possible  proposals  for  change  in  the  levels  of 
Japanese  import  duties  on  liquors,  the  following  two  alternative 
principles could  be  applied: 
The  first principle would  argue  that as  between Japan  and 
the  EC,  two  advanced  industrial  economic  areas  both 
having well  developed  and  diversified  liquor manufacture, 
equity  and  free  trading  principles would  suggest  that  the 
Japanese  import  duty  structure  could  be  brought  down  to 
approximately  the  same  levels  as  those  currently  used  in 
EC  markets.  This  is  a  very  powerful  proposal.  It would 
demonstrate  Japanese willingness  not  to  go  on  protecting 
an  industry  which  ought  not  to  need  such  protection  any 
longer;  and  perhaps  more  significantly,  given  the 
tremendous  basic  potential  for  increased  import  volumes, 
particularly  in  wine,  it  would  at  one  stroke  make 
possible  a  very  significant  impact  on  the  whole  issue  of 
Japan/EC  trade  imbalance  and  friction. -51-
The  second  approach  would  be  to  examine  the  competitive 
retail  prices  of major  imported  and  domestic  liquors  and, 
on  the  assumption  that  the  proposals  for  liquor  tax 
changes  set  out  in  Part  C  are  adopted,  to  make  a 
commercial  judgement  as  to  the  maximum  level  of  import 
duties  that  would  be  compatible  with  a  reasonable 
competitive  situation  between  the  domestic  and  the 
imported  products.  This  is  in  most  respects  a  far  less 
attractive proposal. 
5.1  Proposals  for  Equalisation  of  Import  Tariffs  on  Liquor  as 
between Japan  and  EC 
The  detailed  development  of  a  proposal  along  these  lines  would 
be  relatively  straightforward.  It would  involve,  at  a  selected 
and  appropriate  Y/ECU  exchange  rate,  the  calculation  of 
corresponding Yen  duty  rates  using  the  same  duty basis as  in  the 
EC  schedules. 
An  alternative  approach,  which  would  allow  more  flexibility  on 
the  Japanese  side  and  would  be  equally  appreciated  from  the  EC 
viewpoint,  would  be  the  development  of  a  new  Japanese  import 
duty  structure built on  components  from  both  the U.S.  and  the  EC 
current  tax  schedules.  For  example,  a  system  could  be  developed 
using  the  higher  of  the  U.S.  and  EC  duties  for  each  specific 
item. -52-
5.2  Maximum  Duty  Levels  for  Reasonable  Competitive Balance 
In  the  consultants'  view,  this  is  in  almost  all  respects  the 
less attractive of  the  two  options.  This  is because: 
It  is  not  built  upon  the  principle  of  duty  equality 
between  major  developed  nations  and  would  not  even 
provide  a  starting point  for  the  eventual  achievement  of 
that goal. 
It ·would  involve  a  piecemeal  restructuring  of  parts  of 
the  tariff  to  meet  specific  problems,  rather  than  a 
fundamental  restructuring  of  the  whole  system  on  a 
common  basis. 
It  would  also,  to  some  extent,  leave  unresolved  the 
inequity  in  the  wine  business  caused  by  the  very  low 
preferential  duty  rate  for  imported  bulk. 
With  these  reservations,  a  set  of  adjustments  to  existing 
tariffs  could  be  proposed,  each  designed  to  overcome  specific 
anomalies  and  inequities  in  the  existing  structure.  In  making 
these  proposals,  assumptions  have  to be made  about  future  levels 
of  liquor  tax,  to  assess  the  combined  fiscal  burden  and  the 
effect  of  this  on  retail prices. 
The  main  components  would  be  as  follows: 
Whisky 
Assuming  the  implementation  of  the  liquor  tax  proposals  in  Part 
C above,  a  reasonably  competitive  situation in  the whisky market 
in  Japan  could  be  achieved  by  a  reduction  of  the  existing  duty 
on  Scotch  whisky  by  35%  to  approximately  ¥200  per  litre.  (If 
actual  tax  changes  fall  significantly  short  of  the  proposed 
levels,  no  amount  of  duty  adjustment would  help;  for whisky,  tax 
is  the key.) 
I' 
I 
I 
i 
I' 
I' 
I -53-
If  this  were  achieved,  we  believe  that  with  some  minor 
adjustment  to  product  costings  and  margins,  a  pattern  of  retail 
prices  for  major  domestic  and  imported  qualities  could  be 
achieved  as  follows: 
Whisky  Price  Comparisons 
Basis:  liquor  tax:  ¥1850/litre of  alcohol 
import  duty:  effectively ¥200/litre 
Retail  Prices  (¥) 
Product 
Domestic Whisky 
Suntor;l  Red  (720  ml) 
White  (760  ml) 
Old  (760  ml) 
Royal  (720  ml) 
Scotch Whisky 
Basic  Standard 43  (750  ml) 
Premium  Standard 43  (750  ml) 
Intermediate 43  (750  ml) 
Deluxe  43  (750  ml) 
Estimated  New 
1,300 - 1,320 
1,370 
1,570 
3,000 
2,000 
2,300 
3,000 
5,000 
Current 
900 
1,620 
3,170 
5,000 
4,150 
4,150 
5,000 
8,500-
10,000 
Note:  To  indicate  the  relative  impact  of  tax  and  duty  changes: 
in  the  case  of  Premium  Standard  Scotch  above,  over  90%  of  the 
total retail price  reduction results  from  the  tax  change. -54-
As  will be  seen  from  the  above  table,  the  total  range  of  whisky 
prices would  be  considerably  condensed  under  such  a  scheme.  The 
key  features  are  as  follows: 
Prices  of  the  lowest  grade  of  domestic  whiskies  would 
rise. 
Prices  of  first  and 
decline,  the  former 
substantial  amount. 
special  grade  whiskies  would 
modestly,  the  latter  by  a 
The  relationship  between  Suntory  Old  and  premium 
standard  Scotch whisky  would  move  in favour  of Scotch  in 
absolute  terms  (price  gap  narrowed  from  ¥980  to  ¥730) 
but  in favour  of  Suntory  in  percentage  terms. 
To  address  the  existing  inequality  between  duties  on  Scotch 
whisky  and  those  on  bourbon  and  rye,  it would  seem  reasonable 
under  this  proposal  for all  forms  of bottled whisky  to be  set at 
the  same  rate of ¥200  per litre. 
Table Wine 
Before  developing  proposals  for  change,  it  will  be  useful  to 
examine  the  impact  of  existing  duty  and  tax  rates  on  local  and 
imported  wines  at various  price  levels.  These  are  shown  in  the 
table below: Item 
C.I.F.  or 
Factory  Cost 
Duty* 
Tax 
Into Store 
Duty/Tax  ) 
% C.I.F.  or  ) 
Factory  Cost) 
Retail Price 
(St'd Margins) 
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Table Wine 
Comparisons  at Current  Duty/Tax  Rates 
(¥/750 ml  bottle) 
Local  Imp.  Local  Imp.  Imp. 
250  250  400  400  554 
9  125  9  152  210 
259  375  409  552  764 
37  45  45  45  45 
296  420  454  597  809 
18  68  14  49  46 
600  850  950  1200  1650 
Imp. 
555 
210 
765 
383 
1148 
107 
2350 
*  Duty  on  domestic  product  assumes  average  mix  of  39%  imported 
bulk,  37%  grape must,  24%  local  grape. 
The  table  pinpoints  several effects: 
The  large difference  in  duty  impact  on  imported  bottled 
wine  compared  with  local  product  using  a  proportion  of 
imported  bulk.  The  difference  escalates  as  the  C.I.F. 
increases. 
Imp. 
1000 
210 
1210 
605 
1815 
82 
3700 -56-
The  impact  of  ad  valorem  taxes  from  a  C.I.F.  of 
¥555/bottle.  A  single  yen  on  the  C.I.F.  adds  some  ¥700 
to  the  retail price. 
In  order  to  develop  a  more  equitable  structure  of  duty,  it has 
been  assumed  that  the  tax  proposals  set  out  above  in Part  C are 
introduced.  If  this  1.s  achieved,  import  duties  at  65%  of  the 
current  levels  (or  just  over  80%  of  the  rates  to  be  introduced 
in April  1987)  would  produce  a  reasonably  competitive  scenario, 
as  follows: -57-
Table Wine 
Comparisons  at New  Duty/Tax  Rates 
(¥/750  ml  bottle) 
Assume:  -duty  at  24.7%  ad  val.,  minimum  ¥108/litre,  max 
¥182/litre 
- tax  (as  per Part  C)  at ¥101.75/litre 
Item  Local  Imp.  Local  Imp.  Imp.  Imp. 
C.I.F.  or  )  250  250  400  400  555  1000 
Factory  Cost) 
Duty*  7  81  7  99  137  137 
257  331  407  499  692  1137 
Tax  76  76  76  76  76  76 
Into Store  333  407  483  575  768  1213 
Duty  Tax  %  ) 
C.I.F.  Factory)  33  63  21  44  38  21 
Cost  ) 
Retail  price 
(St'd Margins)  700  850  1000  1200  1600  2500 
*  Duty  on  domestic  product  assumes  average  domestic/bulk/grape 
must  mix,  as before. 
This  structure has  the effect  of  significantly narrowing  (but  by 
no  means  closing)  the  cost/price gap  at  the bottom  end.  It also 
reduces  prices  at  the  top  end,  mainly  through  the  disappearance 
of  ad  valorem  taxes. -58-
For  comparison,  on  the  basis  of  the  new  Action  Programme  wine 
duties  to  be  introduced  in April  1987,  and  maintaining  the  same 
tax  assumption  as  above,  the  imported  products  listed  in  the 
table  above  would  achieve  retai  1  prices  as  follows:  (¥  /7  50  ml 
bottle): 
C.I.F.  250  400  555  1000 
Retail  900  1250  1700  2600 
On  the  other  hand,~ a  tax  outcome  significantly  different  from 
the  one  proposed  would  have  a  marked  impact  on  the  maximum 
equitable duty  levels. 
Brandy 
It would  seem  appropriate  to  reduce  the  import  duty  on  bottled 
brandy  to  approximately  ¥265  per  litre,  i.e.  by  the  same 
percentage  of  reduction  as  was  used  with whisky  and  wine. 
Conclusion 
Having  developed  these  suggestions  for  detailed 
product-by-product  duty  adjustments,  the  consultants  re-affirm 
their  view  that  the  real  interests  of  all  concerned  would  be 
best  served  by  implementing  thorough-going  tariff  equalisation 
proposals  as  set out  in 5.1  above. (S) 
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PART  E:  PARALLEL  IMPORTS 
The  next  issue  that  has  been  raised  strongly  by  some  liquor  trading 
interests both  in Europe  and  in Japan  is  that  of parallel  imports. 
The  products  subject  to  parallels  being  the  well  established  and 
leading brands  in  each  sector,  the  concern  relates mainly  to  the  top 
brands  of  Scotch  whisky  and  brandy;  minor  brands  are  less  subject  to 
parallel  imports  and  wine at  this  stage hardly at all. 
As  this  is  a  question  on  which  strongly  differing  views  are  held  by 
the  various  interested~  parties,  let  us  initially  make  a  brief 
statement  of  these  differing  attitudes  and  views  as  we  understand 
them. 
1.  Summary  of Arguments 
There  are  two  basic  schools  of  economic  thought  on  the  question 
of  parallel  imports: 
on  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  school  that  seeks  to 
achieve maximum  economic  efficiency  through  free  and  open 
competition  and  the  inter-play  of  market  forces. 
Adherents  of  this  school  tend  to  oppose  all  constraints 
on  trade:  at  one  level,  protectionist  constraints  on 
international  trade,  at  another  level,  constraints  on, 
for  example,  retail  pricing,  parallel  imports,  etc.,  as 
limits  to  free  competition  and  therefore,  as  barriers  to 
economic  efficiency.  This  could  be  called  the  'macro' 
view. -60-
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  view  that  economic 
efficiency  is  best  achieved,  at· micro  level,  through 
profit  maximising  of  the  individual  firm.  Profitable 
firms  create  jobs,  make  investments,  in  fact  are  the 
driving  force  of  a  capitalist  economy.  Many  firms  seek 
to  maximise  profits  by  designing  unique  products  for 
particular market  segments  and  spending money  on  relevant 
forms  of  promotion  to  secure a  protected market  niche  for 
their  products.  From  this  standpoint,  parallel  imports 
are  regarded  as  a  threat  to  effective  marketing  and 
should,  therefore,  be  controlled.  We  could  call this  the 
'micro'  view. 
The  macro  view  is  the  basic  argument  for  the  free  market  or  free 
competition.  Its  objective  is  to  provide  consumers  with  the 
goods  they  seek,  with  a  fully  operational  price/volume  mechanism 
at  work  in  the  market.  It  normally  presupposes  a  significant 
number  of  producers  supplying  basically  similar  goods  to 
numerically  large  consumer  markets.  It works  best when  there are 
no  constraints  on  the  freedom  of  trade:  when  everyone  is  free  to 
buy  to and  sell  from  everyone  else. 
Such  a  system,  if  functioning  properly,  provides  genuine  market 
control  over  prices.  Any  supplier whose  prices  are  above  market 
rates,  for  products  that  are  basically  not  differentiated  from 
his  competitors,  automatically  loses  sales. 
The  free  market  system  is  typically  seen  in  the  marketing  of 
commodities:  coal  and  other  minerals,  metals.  Competition  in 
these  markets  is  mainly,  though  not  entirely,  price-based.  In 
consumer  products,  the  phenomenon  of  generics  (basically 
unbranded,  medium  quality  merchandise  sole  on  price  through 
supermarkets)  are an  example  of  this  trading  system at work. -61-
In  the  marketing  of  consumer  goods  of  all  kinds,  including 
liquors,  the  operation  of  free  trading  mechanisms,  like  for 
example  the  free  flow  of  parallel  imports,  is  seen  as  beneficial 
by  adherents  to  the  'macro'  view.  Parallels  provide  extra, 
competing  channels  of distribution,  they  increase  the  penetration 
and  visibility  of  the  product  in  the  market  and  they  cut  across 
the  established  pricing  mechanisms  of  the  regular  marketing 
channels,  benefitting  the  consumer  and  increasing sales. 
In  the  case  of  major  brands  of  Scotch  and  brandy,  all  these 
effects  are  seen  to  some  extent;  this  is  claimed  to  include 
increased  sales  (20  - 30%  of  total  sales  of  leading  brands  are 
estimated  to be  par~llels), at any  rate  in  the  short  term. 
The  micro  view  starts  from  different  premises.  During  the  past 
half  century  or  more,  large  sectors  of  western  suppliers  of 
products  or  services,  for  both  consumer  and  industrial  markets, 
have  adopted  a  business  philosophy  in which  they: 
identify  broadly  which  product/ service  areas  and  which 
market  sectors  they  aim  to handle 
through  market  research  and  other  means,  develop  an 
understanding  of  the  present  and  future  needs  of 
customers  in  the  target market  segments 
design  and  develop  specific  products  to  meet  those  needs 
and  identify  the  products  to  consumers  by  means  of  brand 
name,  packaging  and  other  forms  of  presentation 
communicate  information  about  the  product,  by  means  of 
advertising,  salesmen  and  other  forms  of  promotion 
set  up  efficient  distribution  networks,  to  deliver  the 
product/service at  the  right  time  and  place  and  at  lowest 
cost,  to· the  user. -62-
This  whole  process  aims,  in essence,  to  set up  mini-monopolies or 
franchises,  avoiding  direct  price-competition  by  providing  and 
promoting  products/services  with  unique  benefits.  Long-run 
maximisation  of  corporate profits  is believed  to be best  achieved 
by  this  process. 
For  branded  Scotch  whisky  and  brandy,  the  marketing  process  is 
said  to  require,  among  other  things: 
A  sales  force  in  Japan,  to  promote  the  product  to  the 
retail  (and wholesale)  trade  channels 
Advertising~  and  promotion  expenditures  (always  high  in 
Japan  to make  any  impact),  to generate demand  at consumer 
level  and  pull  the  product  through  the  distribution 
system 
Financial  support  for  the  distribution  and  servicing  of 
the brand 
A price  structure  that  provides  room  for  these  necessary 
marketing  expenditures. 
The  basic  reason  why  parallel  imports  are  regarded,  under  the 
'micro'  view,  as  harmful  to  brand  marketing  is  that  they 
undermine  this  process;  they  reduce  or  remove  the  margin 
necessary  to  pay  for  selling;  advertising  and  promotion. 
Eventually,  these activities may  have  to be  reduced  or eliminated 
and  that would  (if  the  philosophy  of  brand  marketing  is correct) 
lead  to  the  decline  and  final  disappearance  of  the  product; 
alternatively,  the  same  product  is  on  sale  at  widely  varying 
prices,  which  undermines  consumer  confidence  and  market 
stability. -63-
2.  Investigations Carried  Out 
In  the  course  of  our  interview  programme,  both  in  Japan  and  in 
Europe,  the  question  of  parallel  imports  has  been  reviewed  fully 
with all  the manufacturing,  trading and  public organisations with 
whom  we  have  been  in contact. 
To  gain additional  perspective: 
We  have held discussions with  officials of  the Fair Trade 
Commission  in Tokyo  on  the  subject. 
We  have  id&ntified  other  product  categories  subject  to 
parallel  imports  in  Japan  and  held  interviews  with 
manufacturers  and  traders  involved  in  these products. 
From  these  various  researches,  we  believe  sufficient  input  has 
been  obtained  on  all  sides  of  the  case  for  the  consultants  to 
reach valid  conclusions. 
3.  Analysis 
3.1  Liquor Trade Attitudes 
In  Section  1  above,  our  description  of  the  "micro"  view  of 
parallel  imports  provided  a  basic  summary  of  the  position  that 
is  held  very  strongly  by  all  the  appointed  agents/  distributors 
that  we  interviewed  in  Japan  and  by  the  suppliers  involved  in 
Europe. -64-
These  views  are  reinforced  by  the  domestic 
wholesalers  and  retailers  whom  we  interviewd. 
views  from  these  sectors: 
manufacturers, 
Summarising  the 
Top  brands  are  the  ones  to  suffer  most  from  parallel 
imports 
Prices  at  retail  level  are  reduced  by  20  - 30%  as  a 
result  of  parallel imports 
In  the  process,  the  parallel  importer  takes  a 
'free-ride'  on  the  demand-creating  and  distribution 
expenses  incurred  by  the  regular distributor 
In  the  short-term,  parallel  imports  can  increase  sales 
but  in  the  long-term  they  can  destroy  the  market  for  a 
product 
Current  stagnant  sales  of  imported  Scotch  are  largely 
the  result of  parallel  imports. 
Despite  much  discussion,  there  seems  in  practice  to  be 
no  method  by  which  parallels  can be  controlled. 
3.2  Other Product Areas 
Other  product  areas  that  have  been  identified  as  being  subject 
to parallel  imports  in Japan are: 
High  priced  automobiles 
Swiss watches -65-
In  the  case  of  motor  cars,  we  interviewed  Japanese  subsidiaries 
of  European  manufacturing  principals;  their  views  would 
therefore  reflect  those  of  their  parent  companies  in  Europe.  A 
selection of  local  importers  and  dealers  have  also been  covered. 
The  main  comments  were  that: 
The  products  most  affected are  among  the most  successful 
models,  Mercedes  and  BMW  in  particular,  the  second  and 
third  largest brands  (af~er VW)  in Japan. 
The  parallel  importer  cashes  in  on  demand  created by  the 
regular  distributors,  who  incur  expenditures  on 
marketing,  advertising,  workshops,  spare  parts  supply, 
customer  service,  etc.  for  the  purpose.  The  parallel 
importer  normally  does  not  create  demand  or  provide 
services  along  these  lines  and  it  is  argued  that  this 
cannot  be  classified as "fair trade". 
In  many  cases,  the  parallel  import  is  not  sold  at 
reduced  prices. 
In  some  cases,  cars not  fully  meeting  Japanese  standards 
are  imported  and  successfully  marketed  by  parallel 
importers.  The  regular  importers make  sure  the  products 
are modified  so  as  to  fully  meet  local  safety  and  other 
requirements. 
Checking  and  recalling models  found  to  be  defective  is 
usually  difficult  when  the  car  has  been  imported  by 
parallel  channels. 
Finally,  the  parallel  importer  bringing  in  limited 
quantities  of  motor  cars  enjoys  simplified  procedures 
for  clearing  and  landing  the  goods;  regular  importers 
handling  larger volumes  have  to undergo more  lengthy  and 
costly  procedures. -66-
In  the  case  of  the  Swiss  watches,  our  interviews  were  with  a 
trading  company  and  with  a  subsidiary  of  a  Swiss  watch  maker. 
The  comments  were  as  follows: 
The  most  popular  models  are  the  ones  subject  to 
parallels. 
Prices  on  parallel  imports  are  heavily  cut  (by  up  to 
30/40%)  primarily because  the  parallel  importer does  not 
undertake  demand-creating  expenditure  on  advertising and 
promotion  or on  a  sales  force. 
Parallel  iJDports  are  often  retailed  in  out lets  outside 
the  distribution  channels  which  the  manufacturer  has 
selected  for  his  product.  This  creates  dissatisfaction 
with  the  established  channels  • 
Because  of  the  threats  to  their  trade,  one  Swiss  manufacturer 
has,  in  fact,  established  a  most  comprehensive  system  of 
control,  both  in  Switzerland,  in  Japan  and  in  third  countries, 
which  enables  him  effectively  to eliminate parallel  imports  from 
the Japanese market. 
3.3  Summary  of  the Brand  Marketing Position 
In  each  of  the  products  examined,  the  manufacturer  has 
deliberately adopted  a  policy  of "brand marketing".  In  summary, 
this means  that he  has: 
Designed  his  product  to  meet  the  perceived  needs  of 
buyers  in  selected  segments  of  the  consumer market. -67-
Identified  the  most  appropriate  retail  outlets  for  his 
products  and  set  up  a  distribution  system  designed  to 
channel  his  products  through  those  outlets  to  the 
consumers. 
Created  consumer  demand  for  the  product  by  expenditure 
on  different  forms  of  promotion,  including  media 
advertising,  trade  shows,  retail displays,  point  of  sale 
support,  product  tasting,  etc. 
Ensured  the  sale  of his  product  through  the distribution 
system  into  the  retail  outlet,  by  means  of  a  sales 
force. 
Targeted  on  a  retail  price  range  at  which  he  believes 
consumers  will  purchase  the  product  in  appropriate 
volume  and  one  that  will  provide  an  appropriate  profit 
above  the  marketing  and  manufacturing  costs  and 
overheads  incurred. 
In  other words,  the manufacturers  involved  have  a  clear  view  of 
the  marketing  programme  they  believe  best  suits  their  product 
and  try  to  control  their marketing  activities  in  line with  this 
programme. 
Examples  in  the  liquor  trade  in Japan would  include: 
Premium  brands  of  Scotch  retailed as  gifts  in department 
stores 
Cognac  marketed  through  high-class bars 
What  happens  when  parallel  imports  enter  the  scene  is  that  the 
manufacturer's ability  to manage  the marketing  of his  product  is 
disrupted  or  in  some  cases  destroyed.  In  the  case  of  Scotch 
whisky  and  brandy,  the  ingredient  of  the marketing  plan affected 
has  been  primarily  price. -68-
In  summary,  then,  the  manufacturer  through  the  par,allel  import 
phenomenon  loses  control  of  all  or  part  of  the  process  through 
which  he  plans  to  market  his  products.  In  our  opinion,  this  is 
the  key  argument  on  this  side  of  the  case.  Others  put  forward 
by  distributors  (e.g.  that  they are  losing a  proportion of  their 
sales  and  profits  to  the  parallel  importer)  may  be  true  and 
painful  for  the  importer  but  not  a  valid  argument  at  the  level 
of  principle. 
The  next  question  is:  does  a  manufacturer  have  the  right  to 
maintain  control  of  the  marketing  of  his  product?  In  this 
context,  a  number  of  comments  can  be  made: 
The  decision  by  a  manufacturer  to  handle  his  product  by 
the "brand marketing"  method  (as  defined)  is,  obviously, 
a  basic  and  fundamental  policy  decision,  in  most  cases 
carefully  and  deliberately  taken. 
Such  a  decision  means  that  in  the  manufacturer's 
considered  judgement,  the  brand  marketing  approach, 
including  (by  definition)  the  necessary  advertising, 
promotion  and  selling  support,  is  the  best  way  to 
achieve maximum  marketing  performance. 
Other  methods,  including  that  of  putting  the  product  on 
sale with  little or  no  marketing  support  and  selling  at 
lower  prices,  have  been  deliberately  rejected  as 
unlikely  to achieve  the best marketing  result. 
A  very  large  number  of  industries,  product  sectors  and 
individual  companies  employ  the brand marketing approach 
for wide  ranges  of  products  in  large numbers  of markets, 
clearly  in  the  belief  that  it  will  produce  the  best 
performance  in  the market  place. -69-
In  our  view,  it is  reasonable  for  manufacturers  who  have  chosen 
the  brand  marketing  route,  to  use  every  avenue  legally  open  to 
them  to  make  sure  that  this  route  is  actually  followed.  In 
particular,  brand  marketing  requires  marketing  expense  (on 
advertising,  sales  forces,  etc.),  to  create  awareness  of  and 
demand  for  the  product  with  the  consumers  and  to  ensure 
availability  of  product  in  retail  outlets;  and  manufacturers 
must  take  steps  to ensure  that  the  pricing structure  leaves  room 
for  these  expenditures  to be  made. 
3.4  Fair Trade  Commission 
The  views  of  the  Japanese  FTC  on  parallel  imports  can  be 
summarised  as  follows: 
The  basic  FTC  position  on  parallel  imports  is  that  it 
regards  them  as  a  positive  force  in  maintaining 
competition  in  the  market  place.  Not  only  will  the  FTC 
undertake  no  steps  to  restrain  parallel  imports;  on  the 
contrary  it  will  take  (and  already  has  taken)  steps 
against  any  organisation  found  preventing  or  hindering 
parallel  imports  of  genuine  goods. 
From  the  documents  presented  in  Appendix  6,  it  can  be 
seen  that: 
the  FTC  maintain  that  hindrance  of  parallel 
imports  of  genuine  goods  is  likely  to constitute 
an  unfair  trade  practice  prohibited  by  the 
Antimonopoly Act. -70-
importers  in  Japan  entering  into  sole  import 
distributorship  contracts  with  overseas  firms 
are  given  guidance  to  the  effect  that  hindering 
unjustly  parallel  importation  of  the  goods 
covered  by  the  contract  is  a  restriction  which 
is  likely  to  constitute  an  unfair  trade 
practice. 
The  history  leading  up  to  the  present  policy  is  well 
known.  Prior to 1970,  it was  held  that parallel  imports 
impaired  the  rights  of  the  sole  importer  as  licensee  of 
the  trademark  on  the  goods.  However,  in  the Parker case 
in 1970,  i~ was  held  that  these  trademark  rights are not 
impaired,  provided  the  product  imported  by  parallel 
method  is  a  legitimate  and  genuine  product.  This 
finding was  re-enforced  in  the Lacoste  case earlier this 
year,  in which  a  similar  judgement  was  handed  down. 
So  ever  since  1970  and  the Parker case,  the  FTC  has held 
that  parallel  imports  are  in  no  sense  an  illegal 
activity  and  on  the  contrary,  that  the  prevention  of 
parallel  imports  could  be  considered  as  an  unfair  trade 
practice. 
The  reasons  given  by  the  FTC  for  their  support  of 
parallel  imports  are  that  in  general  terms  they  benefit 
the  consumer.  They  provide  an  additional  ingredient  of 
competition  against  the  potentially  monopolistic 
position  of  the  sole  distributor  and  are  likely  to  lead 
to  lower  market  prices  and  hence  to  more  satisfied 
buyers  and  increased  sales.  There  is  clearly  an 
implication  that  the  monopolistic  position  of  the  sole 
distributor provides  opportunities for  raising prices. -71-
Finally,  the  FTC  is,  of  course,  aware,  that  the  EC  has 
adopted  basically  similar  arguments  about  freedom  of 
competition  and  hence  about  parallel  imports,  and  they 
find  it  somewhat  "embarrassing"  that  widely  diverging 
views  on  the  question  of  parallel  imports  are  expressed 
by  different  groups  of  interests  in Europe. 
3.5  Sales Effects  and  Trade  Flows 
The  main  arguments  presented  by  the  supporters  of  parallel 
imports  relate,  in  the  final  analysis,  to  two  issues: 
Consumers  benefit  through  being  able  to  buy  the  product 
at  lower  prices  (usually  20  - 30%  off  for  liquor  and 
sometimes  as  high  as  40%),  and  through  a  wider  selection 
of retail outlets. 
As  a  result  of  lower  prices  and  wider  exposure,  extra 
sales  of  the brand  in question are achieved. 
Trade  estimates  put  the  parallel  share  of  imports  of  top  brands 
at around  20  - 30%. 
The  counter  argument  asserts  that  the  overall  effect  of 
parallels has  been  to  reduce  import  volume.  Parallel  imports  of 
Scotch  started  in  substance  around  1979  (for  a  variety  of 
reasons)  and  that was  the  time  when  the  5  year downward  trend  in 
Scotch  sales also started.  The  degree  of "cause  and  effect
11  is, 
however,  difficult  to  establish,  as  other  variables  were 
undoubtedly  at  work;  but  it  can  fairly  be  claimed  that  retail 
price  reductions  of  the  type  and  magnitude  created  by  parallels 
have  clearly  not  been  sufficient  to  prevent  a  significant  fall 
in volume. -72-
For  the  future,  it  is  reasonable  to  argue  that  if  parallel 
imports  were  to  be  shut  off  to-morrow,  the  short-term  effect 
would  be  a  volume  loss  which  could  be  as  high  as  30%  for 
affected  brands,  as  goods  at  discounted  prices  disappeared  from 
the  shops. 
The  longer  term  effects  are  much  more  debatable  and  we  have 
found  no  sales  or  survey  data  on  which  to base a  solid  case,  one 
way  or  the  other.  One  the  one  hand,  it is  likely  that  some  of 
the  existing  consumers  of  parallels  at  low  prices  would  switch 
to substitutes  and  be  "lost";  on  the  other  hand,  traders  at all 
levels  here  feel  strongly  that  such  losses  would  be  more  than 
recovered,  through~  a  more  stable  price  structure,  enhanced 
confidence  of  regula~ consumers  and  better trade margins. 
However,  on  the  evidence  obtained  to  date  from  our  researches, 
these  views  must,  in  the  last  resort,  be  regarded  as  no  more 
than  opinions,  albeit strongly  and  deeply  held  on  both sides. 
4.  Summary 
There  are  thus  two  basic  positions  on  the  issue  of  parallel 
imports,  one  almost  diametically  opposed  to  the  other;  and  the 
forces  on  each  side  of  the  case  are both  fundamentally  convinced 
of  the rightness  of  their arguments  and  of  their causes. -73-
It is not,  in  fact,  surprising  that  this  should  be  so,  for  the 
objectives  of  the  various  parties  involved  are  far  from 
identical.  In  the  eventual  long-term,  it  could  perhaps  be 
argued  that  all  are  pursuing  very  similar  objectives;  in  the 
case  of  EC  liquor  exports  for  example,  there  is  a  shared 
long-range  goal  of  maximising  liquor  sales  to  Japan.  However, 
such broad,  generalised goals  are highly misleading;  as  soon  as 
the means  for getting  there are  examined,  sharp differences  soon 
emerge.  For  instance,  a  major  part  of  the  platform  of  the  free 
marketeers  is  to  protect  consumers  against  monopolistic 
behaviour;  whereas  one  of  the  goa 1  s  of  the  brand  marketer, 
seeking  to  design  products  with  unique  appeals,  is  to  creat 
little product monopolies  in  selected market  segments. 
Given  the  situation,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  an  impasse.  No 
way  has  yet  been  found  to  demonstrate  the  inherent  rightness  or 
wrongness  of  either  argument.  In  particular,  the  specific 
question  whether  product  imports  are  helped  or  hindered,  short 
and  long  term,  by  parallels,  can  not  yet  be  answered  on  a  basis 
of  factual  evidence.  Lacking  such  answers,  each  group  will 
continue  to believe  in its own  cause. 
5.  Concluding  Comments 
The  consultants'  sympathies,  it must  be  said,  lie strongly  with 
those  aiming  to  restrict  parallel  imports.  We  say  this  because 
we  think  that  if  a  manufacturer  has  deliberately  opted  for  the 
brand  marketing  route,  with  all  that  entails  in  terms  of 
long-term  expenditure  on  brand  promotion  and  support,  there  is 
little  justice  in  his  being  prevented  from  implementing  this 
policy,  because  of  the  actions  of  traders  with  no  real 
commitment  to his  (or often any  other)  brand. 
There  is  one  course  of  action  open  to  and  already  used  by  the 
industries  in  some  cases,  that  provides  total protection against 
the  phenomenon  of  parallel  imports. -74-
Products  that  are  designed  specifically  and  uniquely  for  the 
Japanese  market  (examples  are  Johnny  Walker  Old  Harmony  and 
White  Horse  Extra  Fine)  are,  by  definition,  not  exposed  to 
parallel  imports.  Such  products  are  supplied  only  to  the 
exclusive distributor on  a  direct basis. 
We  will  comment  in  Part  G  of  this  report  on  the  need  for 
constant  product  innovation  and  improvement  in  order  to  succeed 
in  the Japanese market.  This  is  true  of  liquor as  it is of  any 
other  product  and,  as  will  be  seen  later  in  the  report,  there 
will  be  increasing  pressure  in  future  on  European  liquor 
exporters  to  tailor  and  develop  their  products  and  their  packs 
for Japanese  consu~ption.  To  the  extent  that  they  do  this,  they 
will  progressively  reduce  the  proportion of  their Japanese  range 
that  is  open  to  parallel  importing  and  thus  steadily  reduce  the 
threat  from  this quarter. 
Finally,  it must  be  noted  that  if the  proposals  on  tax  and  duty 
(Parts  C  and  D)  are  achieved,  removing  ad  valorem  charges  from 
the  structure,  it  would  then  be  feasible,  under  different 
pricing  arrangements  between  principal  and  agent,  to  eliminate 
much  of  the margin  on  which  parallels exist. (6) 
-75-
PART  F:  PRODUCT  INFORMATION  AND  LABELLING 
In  the  course  of  our  study,  it  became  clear  that  all  the  European 
interests  involved  felt  that  certain  practices  of  Japanese  liquor 
manufacturers,  tolerated  by  Japanese  authorities,  particularly  as 
regards  product  labelling,  were  misleading  to Japanese  consumers  and 
damaging  to  the  interests of  EC  liquor imports  into Japan. 
In  this  Part  of  the  report,  we  will  set  out  the  issues  and  concerns 
raised by  the  EC  interests,  examine  the  regulatory  situation in Japan 
in  respect  of  these  issues  and  look  at  the  question  whether  in  fact 
Japanese  consumers  are misinformed  or not.  The  impact  of  the  current 
poisoned  wine  controversy will  also be  assessed. 
Finally,  certain  recommendations  to  address  these  issues will  be  put 
forward. 
1.  Concerns  Raised  by  EC  Interests 
1.1  Whisky 
Labelling  problems,  an  area  of  significant expressed  concern  for 
the  industry  in  Europe  and  the  trade  in  Japan,  arise  basically 
from  the  vagueness  of  the  requirements  in  Japan  for  ingredient 
listing in whisky.  (Some  background  information on  this  issue is 
provided  in  Appendix  9.3).  The  overall  conclusion  is  that  the 
standards  drawn  up  for  domestic  and  imported  whiskies  provide 
scope  for  local  manufacturers  to  label  some  of  their  products, 
particularly their  second  and  first grades,  in ways  which  the  EC 
whisky  interests  consider misleading  to  the  consumer. -76-
Enclosed  in  Appendix  7.2  are  photocopies  of  a  selection  of 
labels  from  domestic  producers'  whisky  products.  As  will  be 
seen  from  these: 
Second  grade  whiskies,  whose  content  of  pure  malt  or 
pure  grain  whisky  is  by  definition  less  than  17%,  label 
their raw  materials  as malt,  grain and  spirits. 
First grade  products,  which  by  definition  cannot  have  a 
content  of malt whisky  or grain whisky  in excess  of  26%, 
label  their  raw  materials  as  malt  and  grain.  "Spirits" 
are not  specified. 
It is  our  understanding  that  there  are  "voluntary"  codes,  drawn 
up  in  1980  after  public  hearings,  and  approved  by  the  FTC, 
specifying  the  procedures  for  labelling  ingredients  in  whisky. 
These  codes,  basically  to  be  policed  by  the  industry  itself, 
require  that  whisky  ingredients  be  listed  but  do  not  require 
percentages  to  be  given.  The  labels  currently  used  by  domestic 
manufacturers  are  therefore not  in violation of  the  codes  and  in 
no  way  in  violation  of  any  "law".  Separate  "voluntary"  codes 
were  drawn  up  for  domestic  and  imported  products  but  they  seem 
to be  similar in all key  aspects. 
This  aspect  of  Japanese  practice  is  certainly  unusual.  The 
definitions  of  whisky  used  in  other  countries  are  significantly 
tighter  (as  indicated  by  the  material  provided  in  Appendix  9); 
furthermore,  ingredient  labelling  requirements  in  Japan  itself 
are  quite  rigorous  in  other  industries,  such  as  food  and 
pharmaceuticals.  There  would  appear  to  be  a  case  for  the 
application  of  much  more  rigorous  requirements  to  the  labelling 
of alcoholic beverages. -77-
So  the  issue  could  be  addressed  from  three directions: 
That  the  whisky  labelling  situation  is  not  consistent 
with  the  very  tight  regulations  existing  in  Japan  for 
ingredients'  labelling  on,  for  example,  food  products 
and  pharmaceuticals. 
That  the  standards  drawn  up  and  their  effects  are 
markedly  different  from  the  situation in all other major 
whisky· markets. 
That  there  is an  issue  of  consumer  misinformation in the 
current  labelling practices  of Japanese distillers. 
This  latter  argument  will  gain  strength  as  a  result  of  the 
current  wine  controversy.  Consumer  criticism  of  the  labelling 
practices  of  local  wine  makers  could  well  spill  over  into  the 
local whisky  industry. 
1.2  Wine 
There  are  several  areas  of  concern  in  connection  with  the 
labelling of wine  products  in Japan,  arising because  of  the  lack 
of  precise  regulatory  requirements  regarding  labelling 
procedures. 
As  a  result,  wines  bottled  in  Japan,  which  may  contain  as  much 
as  95%  imported  bulk  wine,  need  bear  no  indication  of  the 
proportions  or  the  source  of  these  ingredients.  In fact,  as  the 
product  is  labelled  "made  in  Japan"  or  some  similar wording,  it 
might  be  assumed  that  the  Japanese  consumer  understands  he  is 
drinking a  pure Japanese-grown  product  (though  this  labelling is 
not  always  noticeable). -78-
As  with  whisky  labelling,  it appears  that  currently  no  rules  or 
regulations  are  being  violated;  there  is no  current  requirement 
for  the  identification  of  ingredients  or  the  origin  of 
ingredients  on  Japanese  wine  bottles.  However,  the  appearance 
of  poisonous  substances  in  local  wines  has  opened  up  the  issue 
of  identification  of  origin  of  ingredients;  and  substantial 
public  pressure is  likely  to be  exerted  for  a  tightening of wine 
labelling  regulations  and  for  the  development  of  better 
legislation covering  the wine  industry as  a  whole. 
The  other  and  more  straightforward  issue  concerns  the  use  by 
Japanese  manufacturers  in  their  labelling  of  French  words, 
French  names,  German  script  and  other  devices,  with  a  clear 
implication  that  the  product  is  in  some  sense  of  European 
origin. 
Enclosed  in Appendix  7.3 are  some  examples  of  labels  on  Japanese 
produced  wines.  As  these  example  show,  there  is  considerable 
use  of  French words,  initials etc.,  giving  (at  the very  least)  a 
very  strong French  flavour  to  the presentation of  the  product. 
The  general  question  of  misrepresentation  of  country  of  origin 
is  covered,  under  the  rules  of  the  Paris  Convention  (to  which 
Japan  is  a  signatory)  by  the  FTC  notification  No.  34  and  the 
related  Guidelines  (see  Appendix  8).  The  latter  have  apparent 
major  loopholes  in  them  in  that  they  effectively  permit 
"corrective  labelling".  In  other  words,  any  use  of  European 
looking  or  sounding words  is acceptable as  long as,  somewhere  on 
the bottle,  there  is  an  indication  in  Japanese  that  the  product 
is made  in Japan. 
So  again,  under  current  regulations,  there  is  strictly  speaking 
no  violation  taking  place;  however,  the  problem  persists  and 
action  is  still  needed  to  redress  it.  In  this  context,  the 
'poisoned  wine'  controversy  could  also  generate  pres-sure  for 
tighter regulations  on  this  issue as well. -79-
1.3  Brandy 
Substantial  concern  has  been  expressed  by  European  interested 
parties at  the widespread  use by  Japanese  brandy makers  in  their 
labels  of  the  terminology  of  the  French  brandy  grading  system. 
The  French  system  of  grading  (  V.S.O.P.,  x.o.,  etc.)  is  used  to 
designate  brandies  that  have  been  aged  for  a  specific  number  of 
years;  but  Japanese  brandy  using  these  designations  has  not, 
apparently,  been  aged  according  to  the  European  regulations. 
There  appears  to  be  a  strong  case  for  requesting  that  these 
internationally  recognised  descriptions  be  correctly  used  in 
Japan  on  the  grounds  of  not  misleading  the  Japanese  consumer 
about  the nature  of  the product. 
The  situation  here  is  straightforward,  as  standard  rules  exist 
in  France,  observed  by  all  brandy  makers,  which  set  down  the 
minimum  number  of  years  of aging  for  each  grade  used. 
We  understand  an  agreement  exists  between  France  and  U.S.A., 
whereby  the  latter  country  respects  the  European  rules.  A 
similar agreement  should  be  sought with Japan,  so  that  the  rules 
can be  applied  to Japanese brandy  producers. 
Other  concerns  relating  to brandy  are: 
The  need  for  protection  of  denomination  of origin 
The  fact  that Japanese brandy  sometimes  contains alcohol 
not  made  of  grape -80-
2.  Are  Consumers  in Japan Misinformed? 
This  is  a  very  difficult  question  to  assess  because  there  is  a 
dearth  of  real  information  on  the  subject.  It  is  an  important 
issue,  however;  and  there  was  a  general  concensus  among  the 
various  parties  contacted  during  our  study  that  the  best  basis 
for  addressing  these  labelling problems would  be  by  relating  them 
to specific evidence  of  consumer misinformation. 
Our  enquiries  have  not  identified  any  valid  research  done  in 
Japan  in  this  area  of misrepresentation.  It is  generally  stated 
by  traders  that  Japanese  consumers  are  not  at  all  well  informed 
about  the qualities; manufacturing methods  and  ways  of  evaluating 
products  like  whisky  and  wine.  This  was  confirmed  in  one 
research  study  made  available  to  the  consultants,  which  touched 
on  some  aspects  of  Japanese  consumer  knowledge  of  wines.  In 
general,  and  certainly  compared  with  consumers  in  European 
countries or  the  U.S.,  the  level  of  understanding  is very  low  in 
this  country.  For  example: 
There  is  a  general  understanding  that  France  in 
particular and  also Germany  are  producers  of high quality 
wines. 
However,  there  is  little  real  understanding,  on  a  broad 
basis,  of  the  criteria  for  judging  wine  quality  and 
deciding  what  to  buy.  For  example,  the  whole  system  of 
aging  is an  area where  Japanese  consumers  are in  the main 
I  •  •  qu1 t,e  1gnorant. 
Awareness  and  recogn1t1on  of major  European  growing areas 
(Mosel,  Bordeaux,  etc.)  is again  remarkably  low. . -81-
There  is an  overall unfamiliality with  the wine  industry, 
with  the  way  it  develops  and  markets  its  products.  In 
particular,  the  whole  system  of  labelling  and 
identification of wines,  much  of  it in  French  or  German, 
usually  not  related  to  established  brand  names,  is  a 
source  of  confusion  for  the Japanese  consumer. 
One  interesting  research  finding  that  because  of  this 
lack  of  understanding  and  because  of  the  multiplicity  of 
labels  and  types  of  European  wine,  Japanese  consumers 
often  find  the  business  of  selecting  European  wine 
extremely difficult.  In  consequence,  many  of  them  do  not 
buy  European wines  at all.  They  back off and  select  from 
a  range  of better known  Japanese brand  names. 
As  regards  whisky  we  have  not  found  any  comparable  research. 
However,  from  trade  interviews,  the  same  picture  of  a  generally 
high  level  of  consumer  unawareness  and  ignorance  also  prevails. 
It is also  indicated  that  the  Japanese  consumer  is  by  and  large 
indifferent  to  many  of  these  refinements  e. g.  the  contents  of 
Scotch whisky,  the whisky  aging  processes,  wine  vintaging,  etc. 
One  of  the  consumer  groups  we  interviewed  made  comments  on  the 
question  of  labelling  and  consumer  informa.tion.  They  suspected 
that  the  intention  of  Japanese  manufacturers  in  their :labelling 
practices  might  well  be  to  mislead  the  consumer.  However,  in 
their  experience,  there  was  at  that  time  no  evidence  eo  support 
this and  certainly no  complaints  from  consumers  had  beeq  received 
by  them. 
From  the  F.T.C.  also,  we  received  the  comment  that,  so  far  as 
they  are  aware,  there  is  no  evidence  of  consumers  being  misled 
and  they,  too,  have  not  received  any  specific  complaints  on  this 
issues. -82-
However,  the  situation  has  now  changed  markedly  as  a  result  of 
the  current  debate  over  poison  in  wines.  A  feeling  is  now 
developing  that  consumers  have,  in fact,  been consistently misled 
by  Japanese  wine-makers,  particularly  in  describing  as  'made  in 
Japan'  wines  containing  over  90%  imported  bulk.  This  is already 
exerting  pressure  on  the  industry  to  change  its  labelling 
practices  substantially. 
3.  Possible Actions 
We  are aware  that all of  the questions  raised  in  this  part of  our 
report  have  already~been  the  subject  of  discussions  in  EC-Japan 
trade negotiations at various  levels  up  to and  including  the most 
recent  Trade  Expansion  Committee  and  high  level  talks.  In 
response  to  EC  requests  on  the  question  of  wine  labelling,  we 
understand  that  guidance  has  now  been  given  to  Japanese 
manufacturers  that  they  must  indicate  their  company  name  clearly 
in Japanese  on  the  front  label  of  their products;  there is also a 
requirement  that  the  place  where  the  product  is  made  in  Japan 
must  also be  shown. 
Our  views  on  these  issues are  now  summarised: 
It is likely  that  some  Japanese  consumers  are misled by  a 
Japanese  manufacturer's  wine  labels  into  believing  that 
their products  have  some  European  association;  and  there 
is  now,  without  doubt,  a  degree  of  public  suspicion  of 
local  makers  on  the  question  of  non-identification  of 
imported  bulk.  On  the  basis  that  that  some  Japanese 
consumers  now  clearly  feel  they  are  being  misled,  EC 
representations  on  these  issues are  likely  to meet  a  much 
more  positive  response  than  has  been  the  case  in  the 
past. -83-
It  is  not  possible,  given  the  existing  lack  of  data,  to 
quantity  the  effect  on  sales  of  imported  liquors  that 
would  result  if  the  EC  requests  in  this  area  were  fully 
met.  However,  as  indicated  above,  there  are  sufficient 
and  growing  indications  of  customer  confusion  for  these 
problems  to  be  raised  strongly  in  future  Japan/EC  trade 
negotia·tions.  It  is  therefore  recommended  that  the  EC 
continue  to  press  for  corrective  actions  to  address  the 
issues  raised  in  this Part of  the  report. 
Another  significant  finding  from  our  review  of  these 
labelling  questions  relates  to  the  confusion  that  is 
being  created  in  Japanese  consumers'  minds  by  what  they 
regard  as  the  very  complicated multiplicity  of  labels  on 
European  wine  bottles.  In  fact,  in  our  view  the  whole 
question  of  consumer  misinformation  should  also  be 
addressed  by  EC  interests  taking  positive  steps  in  the 
labelling,  presentation,  branding  and  marketing  of  their 
own  products.  In Part G of  this  report,  where  we  discuss 
business  and  marketing  considerations,  further  comments 
will  be  made  to  pinpoint  particular  areas  for  European 
initiative. -84-
PART  G:  BUSINESS  AND  MARKETING  CONSIDERATIONS 
In Part B of  this  report,  we  gave  an  overview  of  the  Japanese  market 
for  alcoholic beverages,  briefly  examined  the position of  each  of  the 
three main  EC  liquor  exports  in  the  market  place  and  summarised  some 
of  the  changes  in  the  Japanese  liquor market  that  have  impacted,  in 
recent years,  on  both  imports  and  domestic  products. 
In  the  subsequent  four  parts  of  the  report,  attention  focussed  on 
what  have  been  categorised as  regulatory  factors;  these were  analysed 
in detail and  recommendations  put  forward  for  EC  action to strengthen 
the position of  the  EC  rmported  products. 
In  this  part  of  the  report,  we  address  the  remaining  significant 
issues  arising  in  this  study;  we  will  look  in  rather  more  detail  at 
the  structure  of  the  markets  for  each  of  the  three  main  EC  liquor 
exports,  comment  on  some  aspects  of  the  performance  of  EC  producers 
and  marketers  in  this  market  place  and  finally  develop 
recommendations  for action. 
Whereas  the  recommendations  from  other  parts  of  the  report  should 
lead  to public  action,  the  outcome  from  this  part  should  be  a  series 
of actions  to be  taken  primarily by  the  industries  th~selves. 
Because  the  issues  involved differ for  each  product group,  we  examine 
them  on  a  product-by-product basis. -85-
1.  Scotch Whisky 
1.1  Analysis 
As  has  been  made  abundantly  clear  in  previous  parts  of  the 
report,  the  current  depressed  state  of  Scotch  whisky  sales  in 
Japan,  particularly  those  of  standard  Scotch,  can  to  a  very 
considerable  extent  be  traced  directly  to  the  effects  of 
Japanese  import  duties  and  liquor  tax  on  the  price  structure of 
the  whisky  market.  There  has  also  been  much  price  instability 
in  the  market,  caused  by  parallel  imports.  These  issues  have 
been dealt with  in substantial detail  in earlier parts. 
To  complete  the  picture,  however,  it  is  important  to  take 
account  of  other  aspects  of  the  decline  in  Scotch  whisky  sales 
and  identify  other  factors  that  have  contributed  to  this 
decline. 
A long-term  trend 
The  first  point  to  note  is  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  fairly 
long  term  trend.  Scotch  whisky  sales  and  market  share  in Japan 
increased  steadily  in  the  70s,  from  the  market  opening  in  1971 
up  to  the  peak  in 1979.  Since  then,  the absolute  volume  and  the 
share  of  market  have  been  in  fairly  constant  decline.  So  the 
situation  in Japan  has,  in  fact,  run  fairly  closely  in parallel 
with  the world-wide  Scotch  sales pi,cture  over  the past  14  years. -86-
Price instability for  Scotch 
There  is an  almost  unanimous  view  in  the  trade  in  Tokyo  and  the 
U~K.  that  price instability for  Scotch has  been  a  major  cause  of 
loss  of  market -position. 
been: 
Reasons  for  this  are  said  to  have 
The  impact  of  parallel  imports  on  the  price  structure 
of major  Scotch brands. 
Exchange  rate  fluctuations 
Inflexible  pricing  from  suppliers,  which,  among  other 
things,  has  meant  that  advantages  available  from 
exchange  rate movements  have  not  been  always  achieved. 
In  marked  contrast  is  the  apparent  ability  of  local  makers  to 
influence  and  even  control  the  retail  prices  of  their  products 
through  their  trade  influence.  This  issue  will  be  examined  in 
more  detail  in Part H. 
The  stated result  of  these  price variations has  been: 
A  loss  of  image  for  Scotch,  particularly  in  the  gift 
and  upper  class bar  trades. 
A major  squeeze  on  wholesalers'  and  retailers'  margins 
for  standard  Scotch. 
A similar squeeze  on  agents'  margins. 
General  instability  and  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
product. -87-
Attitudes  and  market  performance  of  the  industry 
There  is  a  body  of  opinion  in  Japan,  among  agents,  importers, 
public  servants,  market  research  companies  and  others,  that many 
of  the  problems  Scotch  whisky  is  currently  facing  are 
attributable  at  least  in  part  to  failures  in  the  industry 
itself.  The  following  are  the  major  issues  that  have  surfaced 
during  our  study: 
For  many  years  (probably  until  the  early  '80s),  the 
Scotch  industry  is  said  to  have  made  little attempt  to 
respond  to  changing  market  needs  in  Japan  or  to  tune 
its  offering  to  those  needs.  The  industry  is  seen  as 
traditionally  production-oriented,  and  is  said  to  have 
failed  to  see  problems  coming  up  and  failed  to  take  any 
real  corrective measures  until it was  hit  by  declining 
sales. 
This  lack  of  closeness  to  the  market  has  been 
particularly evident  in  the  field of new  product  design 
and  launch  activities.  In effect,  nothing  was  done  in 
this context  specifically for  the Japanese market until 
about  1983,  when  the  declining  sales  pattern  had 
alreaqy  been  in  place  for  three  or  four  years.  Since 
1983,  a  number  of  products  (for  example  Johnny  Walker 
Old  Harmony,  White  Horse  Extra  Fine  and  others)  have 
been  specifically  designed,  developed,  packaged  and 
marketed with Japanese  consumers  and  trade  requirements 
in  view.  Sales  of  these  products  have  grown  strongly 
since  their  launch  and  are  still  growing  now,  in  face 
of  the  decline  affecting  domestic  whisky  as  well  as 
standard  Scotch.  But  it is  seen  by  many  to  be  a  case 
of "too little too  late"  and  in particular,  nothing has 
yet  been  done  to  protect  the  standard  Scotch  position 
and  price. -88-
The  proliferation of  brands  of  Scotch  continues  in  the 
Japanese  market.  Some  200  different  brands  are  on 
sale,  with  exporters still trying  to  introduce yet more 
to  the  market  place.  This  is  but  part  of  a  broader 
issue  of  industry  marketing  coordination,  the  lack  of 
which  must  tend  to  undermine  the  market  thrust  of  the 
Scotch  whisky  industry  in Japan. 
In  the  broadest  sense,  the  industry  appears  to  have  no 
marketing  policy  or  plan  for  the  Japanese market.  The 
advantages  of  the  sole  agency  system  as  it  works  in 
other  markets  are  undoubtedly  diminished  in  Japan  by 
the  fact  that  such  arrangements  tend  to  intensify  the 
fragmentation  of  the  industry  and  therefore  increase 
the  problems  of  putting  together  a  coordinated 
marketing  programme  for  the  market.  It has  been  said 
that  the  industry,  in  some  ways,  competes  more 
effectively  against  i'tself  than  it  does  against  its 
real Japanese  competitors. 
As  another  reflection  of  this  same  issue,  the  industry 
has  also  made  almost  no  investment  in  proper 
representation  of  its  interests  in  Japan.  The 
interests of  Scotch whisky  in Japan are  in  the hands  of 
organisations  that  are  not  financially  linked  to  the 
industry.  Given  the  size  of  Scotch  whisky's  stake  in 
Japan,  this  must  be  seen  as  an  instance  of  long  term 
market  neglect,  and  as  one  of  the  reasons  leading  to 
the current  serious difficulties. -89-
It  is  argued  that,  given  the  inherent  difficulties  in  the 
Japanese  market,  efforts  and  investments  on  the  above  lines 
could  not  be  commercially  justified and  that  the  likely  results 
would  not  adequately  reward  the  financial  risks  involved.  On 
the  other  hand,  Japan  is  still,  by  volume,  the  industry's 
second  largest  export  market  and  it is  difficult  to  escape  the 
conclusion  that  the  boom  growth  through  most  of  the  70's  led  to 
some  complacency  and  that action  to adjust  to market  changes was 
far  too  slow  in  coming. 
Strength of  the  local  industry 
In contrast  to  the apparent  lack of  prompt  coordinated effort by 
the  Scotch  whisky  industry,  its  local  competitors  in  Japan  are 
extremely  tightly  organised.  In  Suntory,  one  is dealing with  a 
highly  organised  and  controlled  company,  which  has  been  able  to 
plan and  carefully manage  its approaches  to  the Japanese market. 
They  have  clearly made  use  of  the  liquor  tax  system  to  identify 
positions  in  the  market  and  then  specifically  target  products 
(including  flavour,  name,  packaging,  price)  to  slot  into  the 
identified market  segment. 
Because  of  their  strong  volume  base,  developed  prior  to  1971, 
they  have  built  up  an  earning  capacity  able  to  support  very 
major  advertising  and  promotion  expenditures  on  their  special 
grades. 
Of  equal  significance,  they  have,  over  many  years,  built  up  an 
intensive  network  of  trade  relationships  and  influence,  that 
enable  them  effectively  to  dominate  the  distribution  channels 
throughout  Japan  and  in  large  measure  to  impose  their  will  on 
them.  One  of  the  reasons  behind  this  is  the  philosophy  of 
Japanese business  about  investing  long  term  for  market  share  at 
the expense  of  short  term  profit.  It is  possible  to  do  this  in 
Japan,  given  the  different  financing  structures  of  most  major 
Japanese  firms. -90-
In  summary,  one  has  the  impression,  looking at  the whisky  market 
in Japan,  of  a  battle between  unequal  forces.  On  the  one  hand, 
there is  an  industry  that  does  not  give  the  impression  of  being 
strongly  united  at  home;  it  is  represented  in  Japan  by 
organisations  of differing capabilities,  strengths  and  interests 
and  has  no  any  substantial  investment  in industry  representation 
in  the market;  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  tightly knit  local 
group  which  is  able  to  set  very  specific  market  objectives  and 
work  consistently  to their achievement. 
Advertising and  promotion 
Because  of  the  strocture  of  the  market,  the  domestic  brands  are 
able  to exert much  more  total A & P  weight  in  the market  place. 
In  1983  and  1984  total  Media  Advertising  spend  on  whisky  is 
estimated as: 
Domestic brands: 
Imported brands: 
Y MIO 
14,000 
2,500 
Over  70%  of  the  domestic  brand  spend  is  on  Special  grade 
whiskies,  even  though  these  represent  only  50%  of  total volume. 
By  individual  brands,  again,  the  total  weight  of  spend  is  far 
greater on  domestic brands. 
However,  the  spend  per  unit  volume  and  therefore  the  impact  on 
profit margin  is  far  less  for  the  domestic  brands.  Taking  the 
above  expenditure  estimates  against  tax  cleared  sales  for  1983, 
the  result is as  follows: (7) 
Domestic 
Imported 
-91-
¥/litre 
average  special 
all grades  grades  only 
39.0  56.5 
125.6  125.6 
1.2  Suggested Directions  for Future Action 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  future  of  Scotch  whisky  in  the 
Japanese  market  will  be  substantially  determined  by  the  success 
of  EC  interests  in  improving  the  regulatory  climate  surrounding 
the activities  of  the  Scotch  industry  in  Japan.  However,  it is 
our  view  that,  unless  the  industry  is  also  prepared  to  be  more 
aggressive,  innovative  and  flexible  in its future work  in Japan, 
there  is  a  very  real  risk  that  the  potential  advantages  from 
improvements  on  the  regulatory  front  could  be  frittered away. 
It  is  clearly  not  within  the  bounds  of  this  study  for  the 
consultants  to  undertake  any  specific,  detailed  suggestions  for 
action by  the  industry.  However,  based  on  our  experience  and  on 
the  information  generated  during  this  study,  there  are  some 
observations  that need  to be  made. 
Product Development 
One  of  the  strongest  cr1ticisms  leveled  against  the  industry  in 
the past was  its failure until quite recently  to  take  any  strong 
action  towards  tailoring  its  products  for  Japanese  consumer 
needs. -92-
During  the  last  two  years  or  so,  there  has  been  a  change  and 
some  valuable  work  has  been  done  in  developing  new  products 
which,  in  terms  of  strength  and  flavour,  packaging  and 
presentation,  pricing  and  other  aspects  of  the  marketing  mix, 
have  been  carefully  researched  and  methodically  developed  to fit 
a  niche  in  the  market  place.  Even  though  the  volumes  are still 
small,  these  new  products  currently  represent  the  only  area  of 
substantial  growth  in Scotch  sales  in Japan. 
Much  more  needs  to  be  done  and  of  course,  if  there  are  changes 
in  the  tariff  structure  to  the  advantage  of  Scotch,  the 
opportunities  for  innovative  work  in  this  field  will  be 
increased  enormous~y.  The  key  thrust would  need  to  be  into  the 
large  take  home  market,  by  far  the major  volume  segment  in Japan 
and  one  that  has  traditionally  never  been  really  penetrated  by 
Scotch  whisky.  Such  an  effort  will  involve  significant 
investments  in  market  research,  product  development,  package 
design  and  A  &  P,  as  has  been  the  case  with  the  other  new 
products  recently  launched.  This  sort  of  willingness  to 
undertake  long  term  marketing  investment  programmes,  with  the 
returns  not  available  except  in  time-frames  much  longer  than 
those  that are usual  in  other markets,  has  to be  accepted  as  one 
of  the  normal  risks  involved  in market  development  in Japan. 
As  has  been  indicated elsewhere,  one  significant side benefit of 
product  development  programmes  along  these  lines  is  that  the 
products  that  result  are  immune  from  the  problem  of  parallel 
imports.  This  is  thus  another  way  in  which  this  form  of 
activity  will  serve  to  build  long  term  strength  for  Scotch 
whisky  in  the market. -93-
Brand  Coordination 
We  have  commented  earlier  on  the  existence  in  Japan  of  some  200 
or  so  separate  brands  of  Scotch  whisky.  In  a  market  where 
consumers  tend  to  be  brand  conscious  and  where  the  name  of  the 
marketing  game  is  very  much  one  of  building  franchi::;es  round 
strong brands,  the  presence  here  of  so many  brands  of  Scotch  can 
only  be  counter-productive  to  the  total  perfo~ance  of  the 
industry. 
Given  the  way  the  industry  is  organised,  it is  recognised  that 
to  exercise  control  is  not  easy.  All  that  can  be  done  is  to 
pose  the  problem  t.o  the  industry:  your  competitors  in  Japan, 
despite  their  current difficulties,  have  been  adept  at  devising 
a  structure  for  the  Japanese  whisky  market  and  positioning  a 
range  of  products  designed  to appeal  to specific  consumer  groups 
at  specific  price  levels.  If  the  Scotch  whisky  industry  is  to 
recover  a  worthwhile  position  in  this  market,  it needs  to  find 
some  way  to do  just this. 
Industry Structure and  Representation  in Japan 
The  problem  of  fragmentation  of  brands  is,  in  our  opinion,  just 
one  facet  of  a  general  problem  of  fragmented  and  uncoordinated 
activities by  the  industry  in  the Japanese market. 
Given  the  structure  of  the  industry  in  the  U.K.  and  the  related 
structure of its agency  arrangements  in Japan,  this situation is 
not  easy  to  change.  The  consultants  are  obviously  in  no 
position  to  make  any  comments  on  the  structure  of  the  industry 
in  the U.K.;  however,  from  our  work  on  this  project  in Japan,  a 
number  of  possible  options  for  future  change  have  emerged  which 
are worthy  of  serious  consideration. -94-
The  overall  purposes  would  be: 
To  provide  the  industry  with  a  means  for  managing  and 
coordinating its efforts  in Japan,  in  the whole  field  of 
product marketing. 
To  reduce  the  existing  fragmentation  of  effort  and 
provide  a  basis  for  more  coordinated  overall  marketing 
planning. 
To  this  end,  some  possible lines of action  to be  considered are: 
Locating  1n  Japan  an  experienced  industry  man  with 
strong  marketing  capabilities,  with  the  task  of 
developing  and  coordinating  the marketing efforts of  the 
various  supplier  and  their  various  agents  and 
distributors.  This,  in our  view,  represents  the minimum 
investment  that  the  industry  should  make  in  this market. 
Making  a  significant  investment  in  the  marketing  and 
distribution  of  key  products  in  Japan.  This  could  be 
done  in  all  sorts  of  ways:  by  setting  up  a  new 
marketing  and  distribution  company  here,  to  operate 
industry-wide,  if  that  were  achievable  or,  if  not,  as 
the marketing  arm  of  the Distillers Group;  or by  forming 
joint venture  operations,  maybe  in  conjunction  with  the 
agents  of  major  Scotch  whisky  brands  (such  as  Caldbeck, 
Jardine Matheson,)  etc. (8) 
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Given  the  scope  of  this  project,  the  consultants  can  do  no  more 
than  pose  these  questions  to  the  leading  members  of  the 
industry.  The  only  additional  comment  we  would  make  is  that  in 
our  experience  of  working  with  foreign  organisations  marketing 
their  products  in  Japan,  there  is  usually  a  very  direct 
relationship between  the  level  of  commitment  and  investment  that 
the  suppliers  make  in  the  Japanese  market,  and  their  long  term 
succcess  and  profitability  here.  In  view  of  the  current  state 
of  the  Scotch whisky  industry  in Japan,  the potential  for making 
more  of  this market  and  the  down-side  risks if major  changes are 
not  undertaken,  we  believe  that  the  industry must  very  carefully 
assess  alternative  ways  of  establishing  a  strong  marketing 
presence  of its own  in Japan  and  take  firm action  to ensure  that 
such  a  presence  is achieved. 
If  positive  action  is  not  taken  in  the  areas  of  product 
development  and  the  re-organisation  of  the  industry's  presence 
in Japan,  it is  our  opinion  that,  no  matter  what  is  achieved  on 
the  regulatory  front,  these  opportunities will not  be  translated 
into  maximum  increased  sales;  and  at  worst,  the  result  could 
well  be  that  standard  Scotch will  continue  to be  squeezed  out  of 
the  Japanese  market,  leaving  only  a  continuing,  small  volume 
through  relatively  profitable  premium  market  for  gifts  and  a 
growing market  for  intermediate Scotches. 
2.  Wine 
2.1  Domestic  Competition 
Before  looking  at  the  marketing  issues  facing  European  wines  in 
Japan,  it would  be  useful  briefly  to  comment  on  the  nature  and 
structure  of  the  Japanese  domestic  wine  industry,  in  order  to 
give  a  clearer  picture  of  the  nature  of  the  domestic 
competition. -96-
Key  factors  to note are  the  following: 
Japan's  capacity  to  produce  grapes  is  limited  by 
shortage  of  available  land;  the  scope  for  future 
expansion  of  local  grape  production  is  severely 
restricted. 
Costs  of  local  grape  production  are  high,  up  to  eight 
times  higher  than  in  the  EC  and  U.S. 
Few  of  the  vineyards 
specifically  for  wine, 
in  Japan  produce  grapes 
much  of  which  is  from  table 
grapes.  ;  Only  about  7%  of  total  Japanese  grape 
production  is wine  grapes. 
In  consequence,  Japanese  wineries  rely  heavily  on 
imported  bulk  and  on  wine  made  in  Japan  from  imported 
grape must. 
According  to  trade  estimates,  Japanese  wine  production 
in 1984  was  made  up  of  the  following materials: 
39%  from  imported  bulk 
37%  from  grape  must,  raisins  and  other 
ingredients 
24%  wine  from  domestic  grapes 
Taking  into  account  the  27%  of  total  wine  supply  into 
the  market  that  comes  from  bottled  imports,  domestic 
grapes  contribute  less  than  18%  of  the  total. 
The  domestic  wine  industry  is  highly  concentrated.  Of 
approximately  200  active  wineries  in  Japan  in  1983, 
three  large  ones,  Mercian,  Sun tory  and  Mann 
1 s  supply 
about  2/3  of  local  production,  while  the  top  ten  firms 
supply  about  90%. -97-
2.2  Segments  of  the Wine  Market 
Trade  estimates  indicate  that  about  60%  of  total  wine  volume 
sold  in Japan  is for home  consumption.  Bars  and  restaurants  and 
other  institutional  outlets  cover  about  35%,  while  most  of  the 
balance  is  gift  pack  sales.  The  profile  of  imported  wines  is 
very  different  however;  based  on  trade  estimates,  some  40%  of 
imported  wine  goes  through  restaurants,  22%  in  gift  packs  and 
only  38%  for  the  in-home  trade.  On  these  figures,  the  poor 
penetration  of  imports  in  the  take-home  segment  is  significant, 
the  share  in  this  segment  being  only  around  15%  compared  with 
imports'  overall market  share  of  27%. 
In  terms  of  price  breaks,  there  are  two  fairly  clearly  defined 
segments  in  the market  for  table wines  in Japan,  as  follows: 
The  lower  price  segment,  from  ¥1,500  per  litre  downwards,  is 
primarily  the  take-home  segment,  serviced  through  supermarkets 
and  local  liquor shops.  As  noted  the major Japanese wine  makers 
are  focused  heavily  on  this  end  of  the market. 
Imported  wines  are  also  competing  strongly  in  the  upper  end  of 
this  sector,  (¥1,200  - 1,500)  keeping  below  the  ad  valorem  tax 
barrier.  These  include  the  bulk  of  the  German  wines, 
particularly  whites,  significant  volumes  of  I tal  ian  wine  and 
some  portion of  the  French  trade. 
The  upper  price  segment,  that  is  to  say  retailing  in  the  stores 
at  ¥2,000  and  upwards,  is  in  fact  primarily  the  high  class 
restaurant  trade.  This  business  is  strongly  in  the  hands  of 
imported  European  table wines,  particularly  from  France. 
In  terms  of  future  total  market  growth,  projections  for  both 
segments  look  most  encouraging.  Some  of  the  reasons  to  support 
this are: -98-
The  current  very  low  per  capita  consumption  of  wine  in 
Japan  compared  with most  developed markets  overseas. 
The  growing  affluence  of  young  single  women  who 
represent  a  major market  for wine. 
The  healthful  image  that wine  enjoys. 
A general  switch  in  consumer  preferences  towards  lighter 
foods  and  beverages. 
Changing  patterns  of drinking.  People  are more  and  more 
enjoying arcoholic beverages with  their food  rather  than 
drinking  for its own  sake. 
However,  the  significant  volume  growth,  in  absolute  terms,  will 
undoubtedly  be  in  the  lower  priced  take-home  segment,  so  to 
maintain  market  share  and  keep  pace  with  this  growth,  European 
wines  will  have  to  develop  their  product  range  and  their 
marketing  approach  very  closely  tailored  to  this  segment's 
needs. 
This  segment will  increasingly be  dominated  by  younger drinkers, 
including  females;  so  marketing  appeals  addressed  to  these 
groups  and  products  priced  and  packaged  to suit their tastes and 
their pockets will be vitally important. 
In  this  context,  the  thrust  of  the  Japanese  makers  is  already 
clear.  According  to  local  winery  estimates,  almost  70  %  of 
domestic  wine  sales  are  shared  between  1.8  litre  bottles 
(between  ¥1,100  and  ¥1,400  per  bottle)  and  standard  bottles 
priced at  just above  ¥1,000. -99-
2.3  Brand  Marketing 
If  EC  wines  are  to  maintain  or  increase  their  share  of  the 
Japanese  wine  market  and  in  particular  of  the  vital  low  priced 
take-home  segment,  brand  marketing  programmes  wi 11  have  to  be 
introduced much  more  widely  than  is  the  case  at  present.  There 
are various  reasons  for  this: 
The  Japanese  consumer  are  brand-oriented.  They  respond 
most  readily  to  a  heavily  promoted  umbrella  brand  name, 
for  which  they  develop  a  high  level  of  awareness  and 
confidence. 
The  Japanese  wine  makers,  recognising  this  trend,  have 
worked  hard  to  develop  brands  and  the  four  major  ones, 
at  least,  are  now  well  recognised  by  significant  numbers 
of Japanese  consumers. 
In  contrast  to  this,  most  European  wines  are  sold  under 
a  great  multiplicity  of  names,  representing  areas  in 
Europe,  names  of  estates,  names  of  exporters,  etc.  For 
the Japanese  consumer,  largely  ignorant  of  the  structure 
of  the European wine  industry,  this  product  presentation 
is bewildering,  particularly as  much  of  the  information 
provided  on  the  labels  is in  a  European  language.  As  we 
saw  previously  in Part  F,  there  is  research  evidence  to 
indicate  that Japanese  consumers,  faced  by  this array of 
often  incomprehensible  European  offerings,  are  turning 
to  the  easy-to-buy  alternative  of  a  heavily  advertised 
Japanese brand. - 100-
2.4  Recommendations  for Action 
Following  on  from  the  comments  made  above,  the  key  area  in which 
decisive  European  action  on  wine  will  be  needed  is  to  develop 
effective brand marketing  programmes.  In  terms  of activities to 
be  carried  out,  such  a  programme  would  require: 
On-going  market  research  and  monitoring,  to  ensure  that 
the  European  brands  can  be  progressively  tailored, 
packaged,  priced  and  promoted  to  address  the  needs  of 
the  key  segments  in  the Japanese market. 
Appropriate product  development  and  marketing  programmes 
to  implement  the  research  findings. 
Special  arrangements  for  the  blending,  bottling  and 
packaging  of  the  branded  product,  presumably  in  Europe 
in  the  initial  stages.  Given  the  structure  of  the 
European  wine  industry,  this  will  require  different 
approaches  to  wine  marketing  from  those  that  have  been 
traditionally used  in  the  past. 
Strong  initiatives in  the  packaging  field,  in particular 
to  cater  for  the  low  price  take-home  market  segment. 
Various  innovatory  forms  of  packaging  have  been  launched 
in  other  markets  (e.g.  Australia)  and  some  work  is 
already  been  done  in  this  direction  in  Japan.  In  this 
context,  the  likely  growing  role  of  young  consumers  in 
the market  will  need  to be  addressed. 
Finally,  substantial  investments  in  advertising  and 
promotion  campaigns  to  create  awareness  of  the  European 
brands  and  build  up  their  franchise  with  Japanese 
consumers. - 101-
The  overall  goal  would  be  to  build  brands  and  an  awareness  of 
them  in  the  market  place.  Some  recent  innovations  (such  as  the 
Vantage  and  other  ranges  recently  launched)  are  indications  of 
what  is needed  on  a  much  larger scale. 
If  the  Japanese  market  is  to  be  effectively  tackled  on  these 
lines,  major  problems  of  industry  organisation  and  distribution 
arrangements  will  need  to  be  addressed.  The  major  difficulties 
will be: 
To 
The  highly  fragmented  nature  of  the  European  wine 
industry,  where  the  exporters  are  either  individual 
growers,  c6-operatives  or export  traders. 
The  general  lack  of  marketing  sophistication  of  many  of 
the  producing  organisations  in  Europe.  For  many  of 
them,  the  concepts  of  brand  marketing  discussed  above 
will be  almost  totally  foreign. 
The  related  fragmentation  of  the  distribution 
arrangements  in  Japan.  The  current  pattern  is  for  each 
exporter  in  Europe, 
agency/distribution 
large  or  small, 
arrangements 
to  make  his  own 
with  importers, 
wholesalers  or  local  manufacturers  in  Japan.  There  are 
scores  of  local  organisations  currently handling various 
European  wines  and  we  understand  that  more  are  being 
added  to  the  list almost  daily. 
continue  along  these  lines  will  never  resolve  the 
organisational  problems,  it  will  only  compound  them.  Fresh 
initiatives are clearly necessary. 
To  be  more  specific,  an  overall  organisation  plan  on  the 
following  lines  should  be  carefully  considered: - 102-
For  the  upper  end  of  the  wine  market,  the  higher  priced 
and  higher  quality  wines  destined  primarily  for  the 
restaurant  trade,  the  existing  marketing  arrangements 
are appropriate.  Consumers  in  these  segments  are by  and 
large  knowledgeable  wine  buyers,  able  to  handle  the 
complexities  of  the  presentation  of  European  wines  in 
their existing form. 
Similarly,  at  the  upper  end  of  the  take-home  market 
(prices  around  ¥1,500  per  bottle)  the  existing  methods 
should  continue  to  prove  adequate. 
However,  ia  the  area  where  the  real  growth  is  likely, 
i.e.  take-home  wines  priced  between  ¥800  and  ¥1,200  per 
bottle,  a  brand  marketing  approach  and  new 
organisational arrangements will become  essential. 
In  this  latter  key  segment,  the  problem  is  to  identify 
organisations  of  sufficient size and  strength  to be  able  to make 
the  investments  and  to  have  the  distribution  muscle  necessary 
for  ~he  initiation  of  strong  brand  marketing  programmes.  As 
indicated,  some  useful  initiatives are being  taken by  one  or  two 
agents but  these are still on  a  very  modest  scale. 
What  is  really  needed  is  to  set  up  and  finance 
marketing/distribution  organisations,  dedicated  to  the 
development  of  branded  European  wines  in  Japan  and  possessing 
the resources  to address  the  task  on  a  large  enough  scale. 
Marketing organisations  of  this kind  could  conceivably  be  set up 
and  funded  at various  possible  levels: 
At  regional  level  (e.g.  Bordeaux,  Burgundy,  Mosel,  etc. 
At  national  level 
At  EC  level (9) 
- 103-
Setting up  these  kinds  of  structures will  be  far  from  easy.  As 
we  see  it,  the  initial  thrust  should  come  from  the  EC  itself 
which  should  aim: 
First,  to  create  a  real  awareness  among  the  leading 
organisations  in  the  European  wine  industry  that  there 
is  in  Japan  a  potentially  large  opportunity,  which  will 
require new  patterns of wine  industry organisation if it 
is  to be  exploited. 
To  initiate discussions,  preferably at regional  level or 
maybe  at  national  or  European  level,  between  supplier 
groups  andpexisting distribution  companies  in  Japan  who 
have  an  understanding of  the marketing concepts  involved 
and  some  motivation  to  participate  in  joint  marketing 
projects. 
In more  detail,  one  specific field where  new  EC  initiatives will 
be  needed  is  that of marketing  communications:  sales  promotion, 
public  relations  and  similar  activities.  Objectives  for  such 
programmes  would  be: 
To  encourage  greater wine  consumption  in  Japan  and  thus 
increase  the  size of  the  total wine market 
To  maintain  or  increase  the  EC  share  of  this  expanding 
market 
To  increase  consumer  awareness  and  knowledge  of  European 
wines:  recognition  of  the  main  EC  producing  countries 
and  regions,  awareness  of  the  superior  qua 1  i ties  and 
fine  traditions  of  European  wines,  awareness  of  the 
major  brands  of  EC  wines  being  marketed  in  Japan,  etc. 
etc. - 104-
This  promotional  effort  should  support  both  the  top  quality 
wines  being  sold  into  the  restaurant  trade  and  also  the  brands 
designed  to  penetrate  the more  price-conscious  take-home market. 
All  this will  require  larger budgets  and  a  stronger organisation 
that  exist  to-day.  To  back  up  the  A  &  P  spend  that  the 
marketers  of  individual  brands  would  contribute,  strong 
consideration  must  be  given  to  setting  up  supporting  campaigns 
on  a  broader basis.  These  could  operate at  regional  or  country 
level  or  perhaps  for  the  EC  industry  overall.  Once  the  overall 
organisational  base  for  this  is  laid  down,  objectives,  budgets 
and  promotional  programmes  can  be  developed  and  implemented. 
In  the  longer  term,  another option  that may  have  to be  addressed 
is  that  of  setting  up  in  Japan,  by  European  interests,  of  wine 
bottling  operations.  Currently,  this  is  seen  by  people  in  the 
indus try  in  Japan  as  a  very  long  shot. 
reasons  for  this view: 
There  are  various 
Indications  are  that  from  a  regulatory  point  of  view, 
setting  up  such  an  operation  in  Japan  may  not  be  easy. 
Applications  would  apparently  be  dealt  with  on  a  "case 
by  case"  basis,  that  is  to  say  with  no  rules  or 
guidelines. 
Volumes  of  individual  brands  would  have  to  be  increased 
many  times  above  their present  levels  for  local blending 
and  bottling  to  be  anything  other  than  grossly 
uneconomic. 
There  is  likely  to  be  significant  and  entrenched 
opposition  to  any  such  move  from  existing  local  wine 
makers. 
Costs  of all aspects  of wine making  in Japan:  prices of 
bottles,  corks  and  labels,  bottling  operations  are  all 
inherently highly  costly activities. - 105-
In any  case,  it is asked  what  is  the  point of  setting up 
in Japan  an  operation  that is unlikely  to be  profitable, 
for  the  purpose  of  transferring  added  value  and  jobs 
from  Europe  to Japan? 
However,  despite  these  major  difficulties,  the  option  is  one 
that  should  not  totally  discarded  for  the  longer  term.  If,  for 
example,  no  progress  is  made  in  winning  concessions  from  the 
Japanese  authorities  on  the  duty  and  tax  fronts,  the  only  way 
open  to  the  European  industry  to really  grow  with  the market  may 
well  be  that  of  blending  and  bottling  locally,  inside  the  duty 
barriers. 
In any  event,  such  a  development  is only  conceivable at all if a 
policy  of  brand  marketing  from  Europe  has  been  first 
established,  and  sales  of  individual  brands  developed  up  to  a 
level  in Japan  that might  support  a  local bottling operation. 
3.  Brandy 
3.1  The  Segments  of  the Cognac  Market  in Japan 
Duty  Free  sales  are  a  significant  (estimated  14%)  segment  of 
total  cognac  volume  in Japan.  Within domestic  sales,  the active 
segments  are  the  bar  trade,  estimated  at  approaching  70%  of 
total  cognac  volume  and  the gift trade which  absorbs most  of the 
remaining  volume.  The  take-home  trade  is  virtually 
non-existent.  As  the  bar  trade  tends  to  be  at  the  high-class 
end  of  the market,  the  cognac  ranges  have  been able  to maintain 
their  position,  because  the  distributors  have  reasonably  good 
access  to  these  key  market  segments  and  do  not  face  price 
competition as  they  do  in  the  take-home  area. - 106-
There  is,  however,  some  concern  at  the  potential  future  status 
of  this high-class bar  trade.  It is seen by  many  as  a  declining 
segment,  with  corporate  and  fiscal  pressure  on  extravagant 
expense-account  spending.  There  are  also  real  problems,  given 
the  structure  of  this  sector,  in  building  any  lasting  brand 
loyalty. 
3.2  Advertising and  Promotion 
The  recent  pattern  of  brandy  media  advertisng  has  been  as 
follows: 
Domestic 
% 
Imported 
% 
Y MIO 
1983  1984 
1,300 
36 
2,300 
64 
1,550 
40 
2,350 
60 
Thus  the  recent  level  of  spending  on  imported  brands  has  been 
roughly  stable,  while  the  domestic  spend,  in  absolute  value  and 
as  a  %,  has  increased.  There  was  a  major  jump  in  the  tota  1 
spend  in  1983  compared  with  1982,  with  most  of  the  increase  on 
imported  cognac brands. 
For  imported  brands,  the  A  &  P  level  relates  closely  to  the 
brand's  share  of  market.  Similarly,  domestic  expenditure  is 
Suntory-dominated,  following  their market  share of  over  70%. - 107-
3.3  Industry  Cohesion  and  Marketing  Effectiveness 
From  our  discussions  to  date,  we  have  formed  the  impression  of 
the  French  brandy  industry  as  being  an  old  and  traditional  one, 
smaller  in  size  than  the  Scotch  whisky  indust~y,  and  in  general 
more  cohesive  and  in  some  ways  more  effective  as  an  industry. 
This  is  reflected  in  the  effective  positioning  and  marketing  of 
a  small  number  of  well  known  brands  in  Japan,  with  a  generally 
high  level  of  marketing  capability  shown  in  the  market  place. 
Remy  was  originally  positioned  by  Dodwell  and  is  now  handled  by 
the  Sanraku-Remy  joint  venture;  Jardine  Matheson  have  been 
responsible  for  the  suc·cessful marketing of Hennessy. 
3.4  Suggestions  for Future Action 
As  indicated  previously,  there  is  a  quite  impressive  level  of 
professionalism  about  the  present  efforts  to  market  cognac  in 
Japan.  However,  on  the  certain  assumption  that  local 
competition  will  intensify,  consideration  should  also  be  given 
to  the  strengthening  of  the  European  effort,  to make  sure  that 
market  shares  for  cognac  are  at  least  maintained  and  that,  if 
possible,  the position of  grape brandy  is protected. 
This  will  involve  activity  in  product  development,  based  on 
proper  market  research  and  taking  intiatives  to  upgrade  all 
aspects,  particularly  packaging,  of  the  presentation  of  the 
product  to Japanese  consumers. 
One  area  of  possible  concern  is  that  of  advertising  and 
promotional  spending,  where,  as  we  have  seen,  the  level  and 
share  of  Japanese  industry  expenditures  has  risen  in  the  last 
year  or  so.  This  may  well  be  a  portent  of  a  significant  threat 
to  the  brandy  import  trade  in  future,  particularly  if  Sun tory 
continue  to  seek  diversification  of  their  spirits  business  in 
face  of  a  continuing decline  in whisky  sales. - 108-
-PART  H:  OTHER  ISSUES 
A  key  part  of  the  overall  strategy  of  this  project,  in  the 
consultants'  opinion,  has  been  to  focus  attention on  a  few  key  issues 
that will  have  a  significant bearing  on  the  performance  of  EC  liquors 
in  the Japanese market.  It has  been  our  concern  from  the  outset  that 
if corrective  action  is  undertaken  on  too  many  fronts,  there will  be 
a  fra~entation of  European  effort  and  the  overall  result  is  likely 
to be disappointing. 
In  structuring  this  report,  we  have  focussed,  in  Parts  C - F  above, 
on  the  agreed  key  issue~  in  the  general  regulatory  area.  In  Part  G, 
we  addressed  a  series  of  equally  important  issues  under  the  headina 
of  business  and  marketing  considerations  for  attention mainly  by  the 
EC  liquor  industry itself. 
In this  final  Part,  we  are  providing brief comments  on  the  results of 
our  researches  into  a  number  of  other  issues  that  have  surfaced  in 
the  course  of  our  work.  In  our  opinion,  these  are  not  top  priority 
issues  in  terms  of  scope  for  European  action;  they  should,  therefore, 
not  be  allowed  to  distract  European  attention  and  effort  from  the 
main  thrust. 
1.  Retail Pricing  of Liguors 
In  some  of  our  interviews  with  European  interests,  it  was 
suggested  that  local  distillers  seem  to  be  able  to  maintain 
"fixed"  retail  prices  for  some  of  their  products,  given  the 
strength of  their grip on  the  domestic  distribution  system. 
Imported  products  are unable,  of course,  to do  this  (in fact,  the 
fixing  of  retail  prices  is  in  any  case  illegal),  so  overall  this 
situation,  if it is  correctly  described,  would  clearly  work  to 
the  local distillers'  benefit. - 109-
Our  interviews  with  wholesale  and  retail  traders  has  thrown  some 
more  light  on  the  subject.  From  these  interviews,  it  is  clear 
that  the  powerful  local  brand  manufacturers,  by  various  means, 
are  in effect  able  to  ensure  stability of  retail  prices  in  those 
cases  where  they desire  such  stability.  Various  verbal  sanctions 
are  available  and  apparently  employed  (e.g.  reduction  of  supply, 
removal  of  incentives,  disallowance  of  discounts,  etc.  etc.) 
which  the  retailer  finds  it difficult  to  ignore  coming  from  the 
manufacturer  of a  product  in major  consumer  demand. 
From  our  discussions  with  traders  involved  in  other  product 
areas,  the  same  comments  have  been  received.  Manufacturers  of 
major  brands,  for  eKample  in  fields  such  as  cosmetics,  soap  and 
other  fast  moving  consumer  goods,  appear  able,  by  various  means, 
to  maintain  reasonable  stability  of  selected  key  brands  at 
retail  level. 
During  our  interview with  the Fair Trade  Commission,  we  discussed 
the  question  of  retail  pricing.  The  Commission's  attitude  is 
quite  clear:  retail  price  maintenance  is  prohibited  by  the 
Anti-monopoly Act,  and  liquor products are not  an  exception under 
this  act.  Manufacturers  are  entitled  to  indicate  desired  retail 
prices  for  their  products  but  these  indications  are  not  binding 
and  any  attempts  by  manufacturers  to  enforce  fixed  retail  prices 
are  an  offence  under  the  act.  For  example,  if  manufacturers 
threatened  to  discontinue  supply,  or  to  increase  prices  (by 
whatever means),  such  actions would  be  an  infringement. 
However,  according  to  the  information  provided  during  our 
interview,  no  cases  of  any  action  being  taken  by  the  Commission 
under  this  regulation  could  be  recalled;  clearly,  the  problem  is 
one  of  obtaining  any  valid  evidence  of  such  infringements  as  may 
occur. - 110-
In  our  opinion,  this  is  not  an  issue  to  be  pursued  by  European 
liquor  interests,  even  though  the  apparent  price  stability  of 
certain domestic  brands,  compared  with  the price instability,  for 
example,  of  major  Scotch  whisky  brands,  is  galling.  There  does 
not  seem  to  be  any  practical  way  of  pursuing  this  issue  in 
concrete  terms. 
2.  Japanese Distribution System 
There  are  many  aspects  of  the  Japanese  distribution  system  that 
have  been  raised  with  us  during  our  study,  as  is  inevitable  in 
examining  the  issues facing  any  imported  goods  coming  into Japan. 
We  do  not,  in  this  report,  propose  to  comment  in  any  way  on  the 
basic  nature  or  structure  of  the  Japanese  distribution  system. 
This  is well  known  to  those  involved  in  the  industry;  the  system 
exists  and  functions  for  many  reasons  that  are  basic  to  the 
Japanese  trade  and  economy  and  the  role  of  the  importer  can  only 
be  to  learn  to  live with  and  make  use  of  the  system. 
However,  there  is  one  specific aspect  that  has  been  investigated 
in  some  detail.  This  relates  to  the  procedures  used  in Japan  for 
the awarding of retail liquor  licenses  to retail stores. 
These  procedures,  operated  by  the  local  tax offices,  in  addition 
to  being  somewhat  complicated,  are  said  to  work  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  large  supermarkets. 
These  supermarkets  are  apparently  regarded  as  strong  competitors 
of  the  small  local  liquor  shops;  they  are  catering  for  the  same 
take-home  business  and  the  supermarkets,  with  their buying  power, 
are  able  to  cut  prices  and  threaten  the  business  of  the  small 
stores. -Ill-
Department  stores,  on  the  other  hand,  regarded  as  mainly  in  the 
gift  business  for  liquor,  are  not  seen  to  compete  so  strongly 
with  the  small  shops. 
Strong  pressure  is  apparently  exerted  by  the  liquor  stores 
associations  throughout  Japan  to  restrict  the  allocation  of 
liquor  licenses  to  large  supermarkets.  In  consequence,  it  is 
estimated  that  only  about  7%  of  supermarkets  across  Japan  hold 
liquor  licenses,  compared  with  almost  100%  of department  stores. 
The  growth  in  supermarket  liquor licenses  is very  slow  and  it can 
take between  5  to  10  years  for  an  application  from  a  supermarket 
to be  processed. 
This  would  work  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  imported  product, 
which  supermarkets  are  capable  of handling  in  significant  volume 
to  service  the  important  take-home  business.  For  this  segment, 
they  are  the  key  outlet  for  imports;  department  store  trade  is 
largely  a  gift  trade,  while  the  local  liquor  stores  still  deal 
mainly  in domestic  beer,  whisky  and  sake. 
So  this  is  an  issue  of  some  substance  and  it  would  seem 
appropriate  for  EC  interests  to  lend  their  support  to  the 
supermarket  operators  in  their requests  for  liberalisation of  the 
retail  liquor  license  system.  This  should  address  not  only  the 
question  of  license  allocation  to  supermarkets  but  also  the 
de-regulation  of  licensing  arrangements  for  special  import 
promotions,  fairs,  etc. 
3.  Product Definition 
European  interests  have  drawn  the  consultants'  attention  to  the 
ways  in  which  certain  liquors  are  defined  in  Japanese  practice 
and  have  suggested  that  these  definitions  and  the  resulting 
liquor  tax charges  may  be working  to European  disadvantage. - 112-
The  most  frequently  mentioned  case  relates  to  the  Japanese 
definition of whisky. 
Article  3  (9)  (a-c)  of  the  Liquor  Tax  Law  defines  three  ways  in 
which  a  liquor  can  qualify  to  be  called whisky.  The  details are 
set  out  in Appendix  2 .1  and  in  a  paper  "Notes  on  the  definition 
of whisky  in Japan",  in Appendix 9.3  of  this  report. 
The  definitions  are  regarded  by  the  Scotch  whisky  interests  as 
excessively  loose  and  subject  to  misunderstanding,  particularly 
with  the  problems  of  translation from  Japanese  into English.  The 
definitions admit  as whisky,  products with minute  amounts  of malt 
or grain  whisky,  which  would  not  be  classified  as  whisky  in  any 
major  market  elsewhere  in  the  world.  (For  comparison,  we  have 
also included  in Appendix  9.1  definitions of whisky  used  in other 
markets.) 
This  purportedly  loose  Japanese  definition,  according  to  certain 
views  in  the  trade,  has  been  used  as  the  basis  for  developing  a 
totally  distorted  whisky  market  in  Japan,  with  products  on  the 
market  labelled  whisky  which  other  markets  would  not  admit  as 
such. 
These  views  could  well  be  correct.  Certainly,  the  nature  of  the 
range  of  whisky  products  marketed  in  Japan  differs  widely  from 
those  in  other  countries  and  this  can  largely  be  attributed  to 
the  way  whisky  has  been  defined  in  this  country,  to  the  related 
labelling  practices  and  also  eventually  to  the  structure  of  the 
liquor  tax  for whisky. - 113-
However,  we  see  no  value  at  this  stage  in  attempting  any 
regulatory  actions  to  redress  this  situation.  For  one  thing, 
such  action  would  be  far  too  late;  it  should  have  been  initiated 
years  ago.  By  now,  with  many  years  of  market  development, 
consumer  tastes  and  understandings  have  developed  in  this  market 
on  quite  unique  lines  and  are  now  deeply  entrenched  and 
established.  Japanese  whisky  drinkers  have  their  own  very  clear 
view,  from  a  consumption  viewpoint,  of  what  they  mean  by  whisky 
and  no  amount  of  redefinition  of  the  product  is  likely  to  change 
these  habits.  No  would  there  be  likely  to  be  any  noticeable 
change  in  consumption  habits  if  changes  were  made,  for  example, 
in  the  requirements  for  listing  of  ingredients  in  domestic 
whiskies. 
Given  the  existence  of  other  issues  that  can  be  tackled 
positively  and  that  are  capable  of  making  major  changes  to  EC 
liquor exports,  our  view  would  be  to  regard  the  issue  of  product 
definitions  as  a  low  priority  item  for  regulatory  action.  This 
is not  to  say  that  strong  pressure  should  not  be  maintained  for 
clearer  labelling  of  whisky;  and  in  addition,  there  are 
undoubtedly  other  avenues  in  the  field  of  publicity,  that  are 
more  likely  to  lead  to  positive  results. 
4.  Bulk  Exports 
In all  three  of  the  main  product  areas,  bulk  imports  into  Japan 
have been  growing  faster  than bottled: 
Over  the  period  1979  to  1984,  imports  of  bulk  whisky 
increased  by  11%  while  imports  of  bottled  declined  by 
31%.  The  bulk  share  of market  went  from  44%  to 55%. 
In  the  case  of  brandy  over  the  same  period,  bulk  imports 
doubled,  bottled  imports  went  up  27%  and  the  bulk  share 
went  from  28%  to  38%. - 114-
As  for  wine,  bulk  imports  again  doubled  while  bottled 
imports  increased  by  66%.  In  this  case  the  bulk  share 
went  up  marginally  from  53%  to 57%. 
In  the  case  of wine,  most  of  the bulk imports  (about  85%  in 1984) 
came  from  Eastern  European  and  South  American  countries,  in  the 
former  case  enjoying  the very  low  preferential  import  duty  rate. 
So  in  this  instance,  the  issue  for  European  interests  is  one  of 
relative  import  duties  and  this  has  been  addressed  in  Part  D  of 
the  report. 
In  the  case  of  whisky,  some  87%  of  the  bulk  imports  into  Japan 
come  from  the  U.K.,  i.e.  from  the  Scotch  whisky  industry  itself; 
and  a  very  similar  percentage  of  bulk  imports  of  brandy  into 
Japan comes  from  French  sources. 
This  trade  is  a  source  of  concern  to  firms  handling  the  imported 
bottled product  and  also  to  some  of  the manufacturers  in U.K.  and 
France.  However,  in both  industries 5  there  appears  to  have  been 
no  industry-wide  policy  regarding bulk  shipments  and  in  the  case 
of  whisky,  the  Japanese  market,  like  other  overseas  markets, 
continues  to  follow  the  trend  towards  the  dominance  of  locally 
blended  and  bottled whiskies. 
Similarly,  we  understand  that  in  France  there  is  currently  no 
attempt  to  develop  a  coordinated  policy  among  the  brandy  makers 
about  supplies  of bulk  to Japanese makers,  there are apparently a 
number  of  small  shippers  in France active  in  the  trade. 
In  the  indus tries,  there  are  clearly  sharply  divided  views. 
Those  who  are  concentrating  on  bottled  business  regard  the  sale 
of  bulk  as  a  sell-out  of  the  genuine  European  industry  interest 
to its Japanese  competitors.  Those  firms  heavily  involved  in the 
bulk  trade  are  presumably  taking  commercial  decisions  based  on 
their  view  of  the  objectives  and  interests  of  their  individual 
firms. - 115-
The  impression  we  have  formed  from  our  investigations  is  that 
there  appears  to  be  no  realistic way  of  changing  this  situation; 
certainly  in  the  case  of  Scotch  whisky  industry,  the  opposing 
positions  appear  to  be  irreconcilable.  The  brandy  industry, 
being  smaller  and  somewhat  more  homogeneous,  may  be better placed 
to decide  on  an  industry  policy  but  the  evidence  to  date  is  that 
this has  not  yet  occurred. 
In our  view,  this will  be  an  area  in  which  individual  firms  will 
continue  to  take  individual  commercial  decisions  based  on  their 
view  of  their  own  corporate  interests.  Attempts  to  reconcile 
these views  and  to  set  up  and  control  any  form  of  industry  policy 
on  bulk  shipments,  seem  likely  to  fail. 
5.  Duty-Free Allowances 
There  are  certain  to  be  pressures  in  the  near  future  from 
domestic  manufacturers  for  reduction  of  the  existing  duty  free 
allowance  of  three bottles of alcoholic drinks brought  into Japan 
by  travellers.  In  fact,  a  request  to  this  effect  has  been 
presented  already  in  the  Statement  of  Demands  Concerning  Liquor 
Tax  and  Other  Matters  prepared  by  the  Japan  Spirits  and  Liquor 
Makers  Association dated  September 29th  1984  (Demand  VII). 
According  to  trade  estimates,  the  quantities  involved  are 
substantial:  about  20%  of  the  current  regular  imports  of  Scotch 
whisky  and  10%  for  brandy.  The  loss  of  this  business  would  be 
serious  for  the  industries  concerned. 
The  request  for  change  from  the  domestic  manufacturers  is,  of 
course,  based  on  the  fa.ct  that  duty  free  allowances  in  the  u.s. 
and  Canada  are around  1  litre per person,  while  those  in major  EC 
countries  can,  depending  upon  individual  traveller  choice,  be 
more  restrictive for  some  products  than are  the Japanese  rules. - 116-
The  strong  arguments  on  the  other  side  of  the  case,  particularly 
potent  in  today's  atmosphere  of  international  trade friction,  are 
that  at  a  time  when  the  Japanese  Government  is  making  efforts, 
under  strong  overseas  pressure,  to  liberalise  and  open  its 
markets  for  imported  goods  and  services,  any  move  to  reduce  the 
duty  free  allowance  of  alcoholic  liquors  would  be  a  very  visible 
step  in  the  reverse direction and  one  that would  undoubtedly  earn 
a  great  deal  of  ill-wi  11  among  many  of  Japan's  major  overseas 
trading partners. 